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ABSTRACT 
 
The Indian and Chinese space programs have evolved into technologically advanced vehicles of 
national prestige and international competition for developed nations.  The programs continue to 
evolve with impetus that India and China will have the same space capabilities as the United 
States with in the coming years.  This will present new challenges to the international community 
in spheres civilian, to space and military applications and their residual benefits.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Why do humans endeavor to understand the heavens, stars and space?  Is it the innate 
curiosity within human nature to try to explain the unexplained or that humans like challenges?  
Whatever the motivations are, it has led the human race to build technology to seek 
understanding of the heavens through space programs. Traditionally, advanced space programs 
have been the bastion of a few, U.S., Russia, Japan and Europe.  However, in recent years two 
space programs have garnered much attention, India and China; each with a potential to rival the 
advanced space programs in the future.  Nevertheless, the Indian and Chinese programs require 
special examination.  These two developing nations, future superpowers, have not let any power 
or dissuasion deter them from their path of joining the ranks of advanced technological nations.   
 
Along with Japan which also has a technologically advanced space program, the three 
Asian tigers will reshape the international order in the future.  India and China, two neighbors, 
two ancient civilizations, two ambitious nations and two nations both victims of colonialism, 
striving to relinquish the last vestiges of their colonial pasts towards their own manifest destines; 
that of becoming great powers in the new millennium.  One way to achieve power status is 
through success in space technology and application.  Therefore, India’s and China’s space 
programs are of special importance for comparison.  Thus, this paper will examine the genesis of 
their space programs, their motivations, their progress till now, their applications, their domestic 
and global importance, and their future. Chapter two will discuss the genesis and the motivations 
behind the Indian and Chinese space programs.  
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CHAPTER TWO: GENESIS AND MOTIVATIONS OF THE SPACE PROGRAM 
 
The Indian and Chinese space programs have reached new heights in their respective 
endeavors.  Each program started with different motivations and goals that have shaped them 
overtime. The Indian space program’s initial motivations were using space for social and 
economic upliftment of the people. Meanwhile China’s space program initial motivations were 
to build military ballistic missiles and garner international prestige. It is my thesis that domestic 
and international geopolitical motivations have played critical roles in shaping the Indian and 
Chinese space programs. The thesis can also be seen through the prism of international relations 
theories of liberalism and realism. 
 
The realist approach considers the nation-state as the primary actor in international 
politics, self-interest, as defined by power are the main motivating factors for state actions, the 
distribution of balance of power (primarily military power) is the critical concern a state must 
address at any moment in time and quality of state-to-state relations (not domestic politics in 
another nation) drives the interplay between nations. Meanwhile, the liberal approach considers 
the nation-state one of many players in foreign policy, values rather than interests shape foreign 
policy, distribution of power is one of many concerns, socio-economic issues are equally as 
important as military ones and global circumstances, not state-to-state relations dominate foreign 
policy (McCormick, 1992, p. 118-119). In the context of liberalism and realism, the thesis is 
reflects of both theories, domestic motivations would reflect liberalism and geopolitical 
motivations would reflect realism. 
 
2 
 
Indian Space Program 
 
The future of India’s space program seems bright but its start was an arduous one.  
Coming out of the costly struggle for independence, India struggled to regain a sense of self, 
purpose and its place in the world.  Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru foresaw scientific 
development as an essential component of India's destiny, the independent space program as one 
important part.  Unlike the space programs of Russia and the United States, India's desire for 
reaching the stars was not born out of an existing military ballistic missile program, but from a 
desire for practical socioeconomic benefits (Indian space programme: accomplishments and 
perspective, n.d., para. 1- 2). This quest for self-sufficiency allows India to pursue programs of 
socio-economic development within the community of space faring nations.    
 
The objectives and motivations of the Indian space program have been shaped by 
revealing economic philosophies and political necessities.  The civilian space program policies 
were the by-product of the politics of Nehruvian socialism in which the state directed policies to 
cure the ills of society. Thus, the program initiated to uplift the personal economics of the 
common Indian. The beginnings of India’s space policy focused only on socio-economic space 
applications until the 1990’s, when the prospects of commercialization of New Delhi’s space 
assets saw the program diversify. In the new century, India diversified its program further with 
space exploration activities. The Chandrayan-1 lunar mission in 2009 was the first successful 
manifestation of its space odyssey, with manned spaceflight being the next one.   Nevertheless, 
even as the space program has advanced and diversified, it still had at its core, the enhancing of 
space applications for the Indian public’s empowerment. Herein, the space program was first 
conceived as a significant factor in the broader national policy of sustainable planned 
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socioeconomic development. India’s political and scientific establishment has traditionally 
focused on the use of science and technology for speedy economic development. The vision of 
India's space pioneers was the realization of the potential space technology held for a developing 
nation such as India to leapfrog over traditional stages of development and make a rapid 
transition to an industrial economy.  Hence, satellite communications, meteorology, educational 
programs, natural resource management and survey were, and continue to be main areas of focus 
for the Indian space program (Mistry, 1998, p. 5). 
 
In 1962, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, father and founder of the Indian space program chose Thumba 
near Trivandrum in Kerala on the southern tip of India to build the initial space complex 
(Harvey, 2000, p. 127).  He envisioned the use of space technologies for the social and economic 
betterment of India and her people. He foresaw satellites as tools of development by providing 
communications, remote sensing, meteorology and television broadcasting. Sarabhai wanted to 
uplift the economy of the nation and its poor, overall to bridge the widening gap between India 
and developed nations. He reasoned that developing countries must leapfrog to advanced 
technology, as they did not have the luxury of slow incremental gain to seek parity with 
developed countries. Also, development of such technologies must be for societal benefit, not 
prestige. Herein, under Sarabhai's stewardship, the space program imbibed two main objectives 
for societal benefits: 
• Management and surveying of the nation's natural resources 
• Speedy development of education and mass communication capabilities (Harvey, 2000, 
p.  130). 
The space capabilities were to be unambiguous in their purpose according to Vikram Sarabhai: 
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“There are some who question the relevance of space activities in a developing nation. To us, 
there is no ambiguity of purpose. We do not have the fantasy of competing with the economically 
advanced nations in the exploration of the Moon or the planets or manned space flights. But we 
are convinced that if we are to play a meaningful role nationally and in the community of 
nations, we must be second to none in the application of advanced technologies to the real 
problems of man and society, which we find in our country. The application of sophisticated 
technologies and methods of analysis of our problems is not to be confused with embarking on 
grandiose schemes whose primary impact is for show rather than for progress measured in hard 
economic and social terms” (Harvey, 2000, p. 129- 30). Additionally, the Indian space program 
has been a product of strong political motivations. Though initially, the space program wasn’t a 
prestige project but with each successful launch, the space program became a great source of 
pride. Political and public support has never wavered for the program because it accrues 
international prestige for India.  Additionally, the support by politicians enhances their and their 
party image. Particularly, after the Chandrayan-1 mission, the support of Indian Space Research 
Organization’s (ISRO) endeavors increased manifold.  The international recognition India 
received after the lunar mission was unlike previous accolades of other missions; it was unique, 
as if India’s space program ‘had arrived.'  The global reaction will be interesting once the 
program achieves human spaceflight. The ISRO has built strong relationships internationally 
through cooperation agreements with nations and their agencies, as well as international 
organizations. The international cooperation permits India to contribute to civilian efforts and lay 
the seeds of future influence. Also, cooperation gives ISRO the ability to access advance space 
technology, deficient indigenously.   
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Moreover, active global involvement by the ISRO makes easier for it to offer its space 
assets for space commercialization efforts.  Even though, India has kept its civilian program 
separate from the defense establishment and has a strong record of this delineation, it was not 
able to escape the MTCR regime. The US has imposed sanctions against India, ISRO and other 
nations and/or entities helping the ISRO gain space technology. The most prominent of these 
sanctions by the US under the MTCR was the arm-twisting of Russia in April 1992 and July 
1993 into not selling cryogenic engines and technology know-how to India, a deal which had 
been already finalized.  The sanctions regime has had the opposite effect on India’s space 
program, in some respects it has slowed its progress in certain areas but it has also emboldened 
the ISRO scientists to formulate the technology indigenously. Herein, it has enhanced indigenous 
capabilities, sanctions being ‘blessing in disguise’ for the ISRO in some instances.  The 
indigenous cryogenic engine, a technology denied under the sanctions regime, is ready for 
integration with the Geosynchronous Launch Vehicle (GSLV) in late 2009.  
 
The program is meant to be a symbol of India's achievement in science and technology 
among the non-aligned group of nations. Also, the space program caters to a domestic 
constituency, from which extends a sense of pride that a developing country can achieve what is 
meant to be the preserve of the technologically advanced nations, a sense of prestige. From its 
inception guided by political motivations, India space policy has been the pursuit of self-reliance 
in all spheres of indigenous space technology without having to rely on foreign technical 
assistance that could make the Indian space program hostage to the benevolence and potential 
pressures from other nations (Mistry, 1998, p.5). In 1971 Sarabhai passed away, a great loss for 
the space program. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi appointed Satish Dhawan as Sarabhai’s 
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successor to the ISRO in 1972. Chairman Dhawan molded the neophyte space program, 
providing important management and organizational framework. Under his guidance, the ISRO 
and other space-related departments were transformed into energetic and sustainable reservoirs 
of scientific and technological progress. These space-related organizations implemented effective 
project management methods to assess, ruminate, master, monitor and nurture ongoing projects. 
Project management coordinated across diverse centers within ISRO, in industry and academic 
institutions. Dhawan encouraged team building and sought to spawn collective decision-making 
frameworks.  
  
Chinese Space Program 
 
China’s space program has grown from weakness to strength since its inception in 1956 
and with the establishment of the Fifth Research Academy of the Ministry of National Defense. 
Unlike India’s space program, China’s motivation for space efforts originally evolved from the 
Communist leadership's compulsion to obtain nuclear missiles, which could also be used as 
launchers to put satellites into orbit.  The perceived military threat from the world superpowers, 
intense nationalism coupled with a desire for world prestige fueled China’s space ambitions. The 
domestic politics dictated a strong military space program that would allow China leverage in 
case of conflict with a superior force, an opportunity to present punitive retaliation in a hostile 
theatre.  The power and prestige, domestic and international offered by the space program to the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was important in solidifying its position among the people.  
The program inflamed the nationalistic flames, unifying the public in common cause, thus 
strengthening the party’s position further. Also, in the coming years, the socio-economic benefits 
provided by civilian aspects of the program not only helped the people but the communist regime 
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as well. In the international arena, the military space program gave strategic space, allowing 
China to pursue its geostrategic politics. It is well documented, China’s continued covert 
proliferation of nuclear and missile technology against the norms of the international 
nonproliferation regime (China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation 
Deeds, n.d.). In order to keep its enemies occupied, it has proliferated nuclear and missile 
technology to North Korea and Pakistan, the two most prominent examples; North Korea keeps 
Japan, South Korea and the US occupied with its hostile actions, while Pakistan keeps India busy 
with its sabre-rattling. According to Paula DeSutter , Assistant Secretary of State for Verification 
and Compliance in July 2003, “At the highest levels, the Chinese government has claimed that it 
opposes missile proliferation…. Unfortunately, the reality has been quite different” (Zaborsky, 
2004, para. 4).  
 
Additionally, in case of any breakout of hostilities with Taiwan, the space program has 
afforded Beijing’s military enough time to bring to a conclusive end, Taiwan’s disputed status, in 
Beijing’s favor.  As China has been an illicit proliferator under the constructs of sanctions 
regime, it has been on the receiving end as well. In 1993, Clinton Administration imposed 
sanctions on 11 Chinese military industrial companies, including China Great Wall Industry 
Corporation (CGWIC), after determining that China had provided M-11 missile related 
equipment to Pakistan (Kan, 1998, para. 19).  Also, like India, Beijing has strong relationships 
with nations, their space related entities, businesses and international organizations as to make 
positive contributions to the arena, find opportunities in space commerce for its products, access 
space technology and knowledge and seek to influence through soft power.  The space program 
is interrelated with the national military missiles program and the domestic economy.  But like 
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India, China lacked the financial resources, technical expertise and infrastructure to endeavor 
upon a sophisticated space program.  Also, China faced an additional challenge of political 
stability, the stability of Mao Zedong’s communist regime.  Mao’s communist regime would not 
falter in the face of apparent challenges and initially gave full support to anyone who could start 
the space effort in the right direction.  With Mao’s support and blessing, Tsien Hsue Shen would 
be the man to give impetus to the space program.   
 
As in the Indian Space Program, Vikram Sarabhai was instrumental to its success; so was 
Tsien Hsue Shen to the initial development of the Chinese Space Program.  Tsien Hsue Shen in 
Chinese means ‘study to be wise,’ and he lived up to his father’s aspirations. His studious nature 
reflected in his strong academic record growing up. He was awarded a scholarship to study in 
America in 1935. His stay in the US was productive, as he taught at universities, worked on 
rocket technology projects for the US military, and co-founded the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.   
His return to his motherland in 1956 coincides with the genesis of China’s modern space 
program.  Within the Fifth Research Academy, the first Rocket Research Institute was created 
with Tsien as its first director (Harvey, 2004, p. 22).  However, irrespective of government 
support and theoretical knowledge of the scientists, the fact remained that China didn’t have the 
technological hardware to build a rocket (Harvey, 2004, p. 22).  Hence, China sought assistance 
from its communist friend, the Soviet Union.  The Soviets provided some technical assistance 
and older rockets, but never current technology. The relationship with the Soviet Union suffered 
from a doctrinal split in 1960, leaving China again on its own to develop the program.  
Undeterred, isolated and friendless, China marched on the path towards military rocket 
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development which would lay the foundation for its space program. However, its space program 
would never truly be a civilian space program, as it was and remains under military control. 
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 CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPACE PROGRAM – HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
Space Program 
 
Roots 
 
India 
 
India's knowledge of astronomy can be traced to the Rig Veda, which dates to 2000 B.C. 
The ancient religious Vedic text of the Aryans includes passages praising the comets, stars and 
sun. The Indian ancients identified nine grahas (planets) that decide a person's destiny. The 
Indian astronomers using primitive tools were profound in their ability to predict cosmological 
occurrences, such as eclipses. They were ahead of their peers in discerning that the sun was a star 
and that it was the center of our solar system. Aryabhatta, a fifth century Indian astronomer 
preceded Copernicus by a thousand years with his heliocentric theory of gravity. Also, he was an 
early proposer that the earth was a sphere. His seminal work Aryabhattiya, translated into Latin 
in the thirteenth century was used by Europeans to calculate square and cube roots, areas of 
triangles, and volumes of spheres. In the seventh century, Indian astronomer Brahmagupta 
calculated the circumference of Earth as 5,000 yojanas at 7.2 kilometers per yojana; which is 
36,000 kilometers, a close approximation to the actual 40,000 kilometers (Indian Astronomy, 
n.d. para. 1-10). Even though Chinese invented rockets, its first practical military use occurred in 
1792, when Tipu Sultan (Sultan of Mysore, in South India) effectively used rockets fired from 
iron canister against the British colonial forces. However, it was not until Indian independence in 
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1947 when the end of colonialism unshackled Indians again to seek science endeavors, 
uninhibited (History of the Indian Space Program–1, n.d., para. 1-2).  
 
China 
 
As an ancient civilization like India, China has a proud history of astronomy and 
rocketry.  The Chinese invented gunpowder in the 3rd century. Gunpowder technology and its use 
slowly spread to the west over the next thousand years. In 970, Feng Jishen used gunpowder to 
propel arrows through the skies. During the reign of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) evolution in 
Chinese rocketry took a giant leap.  Over 39 types of rocket weapons were used during the Ming 
Dynasty. The ascendance of the Manchu Dynasty in 1644 led to interruption of rocket 
development for 300 years (Harvey, 2004, p. 15-17).   
Laying the Foundation 
 
India 
 
The unshackled endeavors for space were pursued by Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, father and 
founder of the Indian space program in 1969. He was authorized by the Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru to lay the foundations of a space program in the country. Sarabhai saw the 
program benefitting the socio-economic spheres of an entire Indian people. Herein, the Indian 
space program was resolute in purpose of helping social and economic upliftment. In 1971, 
Sarabhai died and the mantle was passed to Satish Dhawan, as Chairman of the Indian Space 
Research Organization. Under his dynamic leadership, the new space program was transformed 
into a dynamic and sustainable incubator of scientific and technological progress. Within a few 
years, under his management, Indian space program achieved extraordinary growth (Harvey, 
2000, p. 130-33).  
12 
 
China 
 
After a year at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Tsien Hsue Shen transferred to the 
California Institute of Technology (CalTech), where he received his doctorate in 1939.  At 
CalTech he started devoting time in discovering the theory and application of rocketry.  By 1942, 
he was working on rocket projects for the military on how to use rockets to propel aircrafts and 
ballistic missiles.  He co-founded the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a subsequent reservoir of 
cutting edge space and military technology innovation. The surrender of Germany gave the US 
and Soviet Union opportunities to scavenge advanced German rocket technology and appropriate 
it to their respective nations. In 1945, Tsien was a member of US surveying teams that scoured 
Germany military sites for rocket knowledge.  Upon his return to the U.S. he published a book of 
wartime technical writing called Jet Propulsion. Through the mid 1940s he continued his 
research and teaching at M.I.T and CalTech. However, in 1951 at the apex of the McCarthy 
inquisitions, he was accused of being a communist.  Tsien was stripped of his security clearance 
and placed under house arrest.  His research papers were confiscated but he continued to work 
under home confinement. He was finally released in 1955, along with 93 other scientists from 
the US to Communist China in an exchange for 76 Americans prisoners of war of the Korean 
conflict.   
 
The dawn of 1956 saw a new proposal from Chairman Mao Zedong for the fast 
expansion of science and technology that would enable China to quickly catch up with the West. 
A Scientific Planning Commission by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai was set up in response to 
Mao’s call. Tsien submitted a report to the Central Commission in February 1956 titled, Opinion 
on establishing China’s national defense aeronautics industry. After further consultations with 
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other scientists, the commission drew up long-range plans essential for scientific and 
technological development, 1956-67.  The plan outlined 57 priority tasks to make China self-
sufficient in jet, rocket, computer and atomic energy technology. On October 8, 1956, the 
Communist Party’s Central Commission established the Fifth Research Academy of the Ministry 
of National Defense to start the space endeavor.  This is acknowledged as the Chinese space 
program’s official birthday.  Under the Communist Party’s vice-premier Nie Rongzhen the 
China Rocket Research Institute was established, with Tsien as it director. 
 
China mimicked Russia’s protocols for naming the classified space, military and nuclear 
efforts under generic titles such as the Russian space industry’s heading body the Ministry of 
General Machine Building.  The Fifth Academy’s title was in the Russian tradition of subterfuge.   
Even though, experts like Tsien Hsue Shen, Guo Yonghuai, Xu Guozhi and other scientists 
possessed theoretical knowledge, it soon became apparent that China didn’t possess the 
capabilities to build a basic rocket from scratch.  So, negotiations began with the Soviet Union to 
acquire the necessary technology to build the rockets at home.  In July 1957, the Soviet Union 
agreed under the New Defense Technical Accord 1957-87 to supply China technical documents, 
missile models, designs and Soviet specialists.  The Soviets supplied several R-2 rockets to the 
Fifth Academy, which the Chinese attempted to reverse engineer. However, they didn’t have the 
materials, the resources and the know how to assemble a complete rocket, even a rudimentary 
one such as the R-2. The Chinese lacked the expertise in areas of tooling, machining, welding, 
pressing and punching.  Their rocket production facilities were archaic (Harvey, 2004, p.22- 27).  
Herein, independent of the development of the R-2, a parallel sounding rocket program began in 
1959.   
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The sounding rocket program after several tests launched the operational Shijiedu or T-7 
on September 1960.  The rocket weighed 1,138 kg, carrying a payload of 25 kg reached the 
height of 60 km.  It carried equipment that measured temperature, atmospheric pressure, density, 
wind speed and direction. While, the sounding rocket program progressed, China came closer to 
realizing success of its military program with the launch of a Chinese copy of the Russian R-2 on 
November 5, 1960 (Harvey, 2004, p. 30-34).  The launch site was northeast of Jiuquan in the 
Gobi desert, 994 miles from Beijing.  The Chinese named the R-2 Dong Feng 1 or ‘east wind’ 
(Harvey, 2004, p. 31-33).   
 
Applications :The Beginning 
 
India 
 
The precursor to the growth of a space program was the establishment of the ISRO in 
August 1969 and the Space Commission, the policy-making body in June 1972. The Space 
Commission operated under the auspices of the Department of Space (DOS), under the Prime 
Ministers office. These structures provided a stronger foundation to build the space program in 
the realm of research, activities, coordination and training.  The Indians built their first earth 
station, the Experimental Satellite Communication Earth Station (ESCES) in 1967 in 
Ahmedabad.  This station made a step forward by making contact with the American Application 
Technology Satellite. In addition, five years later a fully operational earth station was 
inaugurated at Arvi. The main reason for the impetus of India’s space program was to advance 
development in several spheres of Indian society.  Herein, Vikram Sarabhai and P.R. Pisharoty 
(father of Indian remote sensing) appreciated the application of remote sensing satellites data for 
the ordinary Indians’ benefit.  In those years, India lost $1.3 billion to pests, $220 million to 
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floods, and $430 million to droughts.  However, remote sensing capabilities could help Indians 
avoid many such losses, as well as in terms of human loss, human suffering and other financials.  
The mapping and surveying of India’s terrain by remote sensing satellites could prove invaluable 
in economic and human terms for the nation.  India sought earth resource data from countries 
that could provide it. 
 
American satellites could provide earth resource data from its Landsat satellites.  India in 
1978, initiated the construction of a station to receive earth resource data at Hyderabad, Andhra 
Pradesh.  This station became the foundation of the Indian National Remote Sensing Agency that 
would analyze remote sensing data. Additionally, the American Technology Satellite 6 (ATS-6) 
launched in 1975 performed pioneering work, such as broadcast medical advice and 
teleconferencing.  In an experiment called Satellite Instructional Television Experiment, NASA 
broadcast over two thousand hours of ATS programs through Indian stations for almost a year, 
between August 1975 and July 1976.  The programs were relayed to over 2400 rural villages and 
covered multiple educational topics such as health, hygiene, agriculture, literacy, family planning 
and rural development.  This first hand familiarity coupled with the immense potential of remote 
sensing data resonated deep within the Indian scientific community (Harvey, 2000, p. 130-33).   
 
China 
 
The Chinese chose the Gobi desert as a launch site for its military and space programs 
due to its remote location and secrecy.  Any launch site in a coastal area would have been 
vulnerable in the incident of a conflict, had large population densities and any launch activities 
could have been monitored easily by foreign powers. Unknown to the Chinese, by March 1962, 
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the US through satellite and U-2 plane reconnaissance activities had a good idea of China’s 
military space activities. The reconnaissance photographs clearly detailed the Jiuquan launch 
center.  They showed three launch pads, as well as two Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites.  
Also, the support infrastructure could be clearly delineated including, accommodations, airfield 
and communications systems and servicing facilities. By June of 1967, the CIA had a detailed 
knowledge of the activities at the center.  As the early development of the Chinese space 
program was led by American-trained Tsien Hsue-Shen, he continued in his efforts to advance 
the program to new heights (Harvey, 2004, p. 31-33).   
Satellite Endeavor: the Start 
 
India 
 
Aryabhata 
The Indians and the Soviets had strong relations, which also migrated to the realm of 
space cooperation.  India signed its first space agreement in 1962 with the USSR.  Also, a key 
space agreement was signed between the two nations in 1972 that paved the way for an Indian 
satellite launch aboard a Soviet rocket and the Soviet use of an Indian port for launching their 
sounding rockets.  The first Indian satellite, the Aryabhata was named after the fifth century 
mathematician and astronomer, weighed 360 kg (794 lbs), and launched on a Soviet Cosmos 3M 
rocket on April 19, 1975.  The satellite would study solar flares and their emitted neutron and 
gamma radiation, stellar x-rays, and radiation in Earth’s ionosphere.  Unfortunately, the satellite 
mission was abandoned after five days when the transformer failed (Harvey, 2000, p. 134).   
Bhaskhara 
India’s second satellite Bhaskhara, was launched on June 7, 1979 in an orbit of 519-541 
km, 50.67deg, 95.16 mins.  The satellite named after seventh century Indian astronomer weighed 
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442 kg, was a 26-sided polyhedron, 1.119 m tall, 1.55 in diameter, with a surface area of 6.5 m2.  
The successful launch on the Soviet rocket Cosmos 3M from Kapustin Yar placed into orbit 
India’s first experimental remote sensing satellite. It carried television and microwave cameras.  
The satellite would study changes in water and vegetation, obtain wind velocity, surface 
temperature, moisture content information of India’s surrounding oceans, collect data from 
India’s eight meteorological stations and relay them to a central receiver station in Ahmedabad, 
and also identify X-rays.  However, Bhaskhara was a limited operational success due to the 
camera system not working properly.  
Bhaskhara 2 
The second experimental remote sensing satellite was launched on November 20, 1981 
from Kapustin Yar near the banks of the river Volga aboard the Cosmos 3M.  This satellite was 
similar to Bhaskhara 1 and provided the Indians their first opportunity in operating a remote 
sensing satellite system for its complete lifespan.  The cameras of Bhaskhara 2 enhanced 
knowledge of water vapor, sea winds, and rainfall rates.  The satellite burned up in the 
atmosphere in November 1991 (Harvey, 2000, p. 135).   
Rohini Series 
The ISRO initiated the Rohini series with a launch of the Rohini Technology Payload 
(RTP) on August 10, 1979 aboard the Indian Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV 3).  The RTP was 
the only one in a series of four satellites to be unsuccessful in placement of orbit. These satellites 
were mainly technology demonstrators in nature used to test indigenous solar cells were 
launched on the experimental launch vehicle SLV. 
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Satellite Endeavor: the Progress 
 
Remote Sensing 
The next stage in development of the Indian Satellite program was the Indian Remote 
Sensing Satellite (IRS), part of the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite System. The IRS was in the 
one-ton class of satellites with upto three linear imaging self-scanning sensors, one 70 mm, and 
two 35 mm meant to carry out of systematic survey’s of Earth’s surface for the use of geologists, 
hydrologists and agriculturalists.  The satellites crossed the same point of the Earth every 21 days 
(Harvey, 2000, p. 137-40). The launch of Cartosat-2A on April 28, 2008 culminated in the 
thirteenth Indian Remote Sensing series satellite being placed in orbit. Cartosat-2A data will help 
urban and rural infrastructural development and management (Cartosat-2A, n.d., para. 1-2). The 
remote sensing system is critical to the national management system for natural resources in 
India.  This system is called the National Natural Resources Management System (NNRMS), 
which is under the auspices of the Department of Space.  NNRMS collects ground and satellite 
data for mapping waste land, fighting drought, water resource management, approximating crop 
yield, mineral development, forestry management, flood prevention, and costal and fisheries 
development.  The nation’s multi-dimensional development program uses 45% data from IRS for 
planning input (Harvey, 2000, p. 141). 
Communication and Weather 
The socio-economic mission of the space establishment was carried forward with the 
National Satellite System (INSAT) series of satellites.  The satellite series was envisaged to be 
placed in 24-hr geosynchronous orbit.  The total cost for the initial project in 1976 was $559 
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million, a joint project between the Indian Meteorological Department, Department of Space, 
All-India Radio, and Department of Telecommunications (Harvey, 2000, p. 146). INSAT series 
is composed of 21 satellites out of which 11 are in service, thus making India possessor of one of 
the largest domestic communication satellite systems (Programmes, n.d.).  
The INSAT series would provide weather and communication capability to India.  India 
became the first country to combine these two purposes in one satellite with the launch of the 
Ford Aerospace built INSAT-1 aboard the NASA shuttle in 1981(Harvey, 2000, p. 147-48). The 
subsequent launches of the INSAT series led to a wide expansion of benefits for the Indian 
populace.  Today over 90 percent of the Indian population receives television; it was 30 percent 
before the initial INSAT launch.  Indian satellites have provided weather information to prevent 
disaster and provide disaster relief, training for farmers, video conferencing and have enhanced 
the overall communications capabilities from rural areas to cities.  
China 
 
Dong Fang Hong 1 
The Dong Fang Hong-1 (Red East 1) was China’s first space satellite, launched on April 
24, 1970 aboard the Long March 1 (CZ-1). Its main objectives were to perform satellite 
technology experiments and atmospheric readings. The 173kg (381 lbs) satellite continually 
broadcast ‘The East Is Red’ music at 20.009 Hz.  The launch of the satellite made China a 
member of space faring nations to independently launch a satellite into space (Chinese Satellites, 
n.d., para. 1). 
Shi Jian 1 
One year later after Don Fang Hong 1 satellite’s success, China launched its second 
satellite, San Jian 1 into orbit.  Once the propaganda value of launching a satellite into orbit had 
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been achieved with the first launch, China could concentrate on satellites with more scientific 
value. The 72 polyhedron San Jian, slightly heavier than its predecessor at 221 kg was placed 
into an orbit of 267 by 1,830km, 69.9 degrees, period 106.15 min on March 3, 1971 (Harvey, 
2004, p. 60-61).  The satellite carried three scientific instruments, a 3mm S-ray detector, 11 mm 
cosmic ray detector, and a magnetometer. San Jian had a successful 3,028 day mission in space. 
Communications  
The next big event in China’s satellite program was the development of communication 
satellites in the 1980s.  China now moved ahead with ambitious plans to place satellites into 
geosynchronous orbit 36,000 km over the Earth. There were many reasons China wanted to 
develop satellite-based communications.  Communication satellites offered the country’s vast 
geography advanced communications quickly.  The satellites would save time and funds by 
foregoing establishment of complex systems of relays for television transmission and land lines 
for telephone communication (Harvey, 2004, p. 96).   
 
The first launch of China’s communication satellite, Shiyan Weixing took place on 
January 29, 1984 aboard the Long March 3 rocket. Due to the failure of the rocket’s third stage, 
the satellite wasn’t able to reach the desired geosynchronous orbit (Harvey, 2004, p. 103).  
Subsequent launches of the Dong Fang Hong series of communication satellites would prove to 
be extremely successful. The increasingly sophisticated satellites expanded TV transmission and 
telephony to cover all of China.  
Navigation Satellites  
In 2000, China launched the first of its navigation satellites, Beidou.  The nation put into 
place a long baseline triangular navigation system that would help provide navigational fixes for 
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road and transport, ships, and possibly aircraft (Harvey, 2004, p. 157-58).  Additionally, in 2003 
China signed an agreement with the European Space Agency and the European Union to 
participate in the Galileo program.   
The Launchers 
 
India 
 
After a few launches of the Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV), India’s first launcher, a 
rocket with limited carrying capacity was proceeded with the upgraded version Augmented 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV).  After 12 years of service, in 1999 the ASLV an intermediate 
rocket able to place 150 kg payloads into 150-300 km orbits was decommissioned. A new larger 
launcher the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) was set to take its place. 
PSLV: Joining the Big League 
From the modest beginning with sounding rockets of the 1960's India has established the 
capability to launch remote sensing satellites using Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV).  The 
PSLV has given India the ability to place upto 1000- 1200 kg payloads into sun-synchronous 
polar orbits.  The PSLV was given the task to launch the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS) 
series. This launcher enabled India to be counted among the select club of Russia, US, China, 
Europe and Japan, able to build large launchers. The PSLV was the third largest solid fueled 
rocket in the world, after the NASA space shuttle and the Titan.  Unlike other rockets, the PSLV 
was a mixture of solid and liquid fuel.  The second and fourth stage of the five-stage rocket used 
storable liquid propellants unsymmetrical dimethyl methyl hydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen 
tetroxide.  India hoped to offer the PSLV’s services in the world launcher market and with it 
recover its $122 million development costs.   
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`The initial PSLV launch on 20 September 1993 was unable to place the valuable IRS payload 
into proper orbit due to software error.  Nevertheless, the next launch on 15 October 1994 
successfully placed the 870 kg IRS-P2 remote sensing satellite into 825 km polar orbit (Harvey, 
2000, p. 154-58). Thus far, the PSLV has had 13 consecutively successful flights (Programmes, 
n.d.). The PSLV enabled India to place large resource satellites into polar orbit for the continued 
socio-economic benefit of the Indian populace. 
GSLV: Joining the Big Leagues 
India began in the 1980s to develop a launch vehicle able to place 2 to 2.5 ton payload 
into synchronous geostationary orbit (200 km by 36,000 km). The Geo-synchronous Satellite 
Launch Vehicle (GSLV) is a three-stage vehicle that assumes solid and liquid stages of PSLV 
and Russian cryogenic engines in the upper stage. The first flight of GSLV-D1 on 18, April 2001 
from Sriharikota Island launch site in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh successfully placed a 
1.5-ton experimental satellite GSAT-1 into 180 x 32,155 km geo-synchronous transfer  orbit 
(GTO).(Indian space programme: accomplishments and perspective, n.d., para. 14). The GSLV 
has had four successful flights out of five missions since inception, the last one being GSLV-F04 
placing communication satellite INSAT-4CR satellite into orbit on September 2, 2007 
(Programmes, n.d.). 
China 
 
China has been able to reach new heights from the era of “fire arrows” and gunpowder 
rockets developed for ancient warfare to modern rocket technology for its space program, again 
borne out of military development.   
 
Dong Feng 1 – Joining the space race 
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The Chinese scientists took on the challenge of copying a Russian R-2 rocket. Even 
though China lacked the infrastructure and resources to build basic rockets, they tried to get the 
R-2 into production. At one point, substantial momentum was building to discontinue the efforts 
at duplicating the R-2 as it was thought too advanced a task for a developing nation.  However, 
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai insisted that rocket development continue (Harvey, 2004, p. 24-28).   
As the 30 year Chinese-Soviet accord eroded in August 1960, the Chinese had sufficiently 
mastered the construction of the R-2 to launch the first ‘Made in China’ rocket on November 5, 
1960; China had officially joined the space race. 
Dong Feng series 
The successful launches of the R-2 rockets didn’t prepare the Chinese for the extensive 
time and effort required to realize further development of the Dong Feng.  The military 
imperatives were the genesis of China’s space program; as such these imperatives continually 
trumped civilian aspects of the space program. For these reasons, China’s first indigenously 
designed and manufactured rocket, the Dong Feng 2 had the capability of hitting arch nemesis 
Japan 932 miles away (Harvey, 2004, p. 37).  Eventually, incremental advancements in rockets 
culminated into China’s long-range rocket, the Dong Feng 5. The development of the Dong Feng 
5 provided China significant progress in propulsion, rocket engine steering devices, guidance 
systems and strengthened light materials. The rocket allowed the Chinese to achieve an 
intercontinental ballistic missile capability, with the USA within its reach.  The work performed 
on the Dong Feng series contributed to the development of the Long March 1 rocket, used to 
launch China’s first Earth satellite.  
 
Long March Ahead 
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The space program needed a new rocket to launch China’s first Earth satellite. The design 
of the new rocket Chang Zheng or Long March 1 began in earnest in November 1967 at the 
Chinese Academy of Launcher Technology (Harvey, 2004, p. 52).  This family of rockets is 
divided into four series with the fifth under development. The Long March 1 was basically a 
three stage version of the Dong Feng 4 (DF-4) missile.  However, a small third stage solid rocket 
motor was added to the DF-4 to place satellites into orbit.  This initial liquid fuelled launcher 
propelled China’s first two satellites into orbit, the Dong Fang Hong in 1970 and the Shi Jian in 
1971. The Long March series of launchers have served China’s space program well with an 
excellent reliability record (Harvey, 2004, p. 211).   
Feng Bao 
The Project 701 was a new launcher; the Feng Bao (storm) designed in Shanghai unlike 
the Beijing designed Long March. The rocket was principally based on the Dong Feng 5 missile. 
The first flight of the Feng Bao occurred on August 10, 1972 (Harvey, 2004, p. 71-73).  But the 
rocket only lasted a decade in service from 1971 to 1981 (Harvey, 2004, p. 209).   
Space Centers 
India 
 
Over the years, the Department of Space (DOS) has laid strong research and development and 
technology foundation with the requisite manpower and infrastructure for implementing the 
space program. A detailed space center list and description can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
China  
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A critical component of a space program is the support infrastructure.  Over the years 
China has developed support launch centers that are fairly large and comprehensive. All the 
launch sites were developed with the foresight of not only establishing its capability to support 
indigenous space efforts, but provide services to other nations as well. China operates four 
modern launch sites.  Located in the Gobi desert, the Jiuquan launch site has two launch pads for 
the Long March-2 rocket for placing payload into low-earth orbit and medium-orbit with orbital 
inclinations of 57o to 70o. The work horse Long March 3 is launched from the Xixhang site for 
geostationary missions. The Taiyuam site is used for sun-synchronous meteorological and earth 
resource missions (Patterson, 1995, p. 5). The fourth, minor site on the island of Hainan is used 
for launching sounding rockets.  Additionally, there is launch site at Harbin, Manchuria solely 
used for military use (Harvey, 2004, p. 195).  Mission control is undertaken from China Satellite 
Launch and Tracking Control Center near Xian that contains Telemetry & Control as well.  The 
tracking stations are spread out domestically, overseas and on a fleet of tracking ships. With 
these launch complexes and supporting facilities, China has successfully positioned itself to meet 
modern space launch requirements and commercial space enterprise.    
Space Business: Commercial Space Activities  
 
India 
 
Unlike, the Russian and Western space programs, the commercial space activities in India 
have evolved from a different course. The Indian program has its genesis as implemented by the 
ISRO as a wholly civilian program, with the goal of using modern space technology towards 
hastening the country’s socio-economic development. From the early stages of the space 
program, ISRO had been responsible for the requisite design, expansion, manufacturing, 
assembly and testing of space systems.  Due to the dearth of private sector and industrial space 
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technology base in the earlier stages of the space program, the ISRO remedied this in the 
mid1970s, with the technology transfer program to Indian industries.   
 
This laid the seeds in the private sector, the establishment of necessary process expertise 
and facilities to undertake manufacture of diverse services and products for national space 
projects. In a matter of time, the private industry started providing the ISRO centers with an 
assortment of electrical modules and subsystems, diverse materials, test equipment, components, 
software and hardware including the propellants, structures for satellites and launch vehicle 
systems, and ground systems.  
 
A significant portion of ISRO’s manufacturing activities were successfully farmed out to 
the industry as part of the technology transfer program. The program had critical residual 
benefits in the form of several space technology spin-offs and in instilling culture and practices 
associated with dependability, reliability and quality assurance. Another important component of 
industry partnership was the involvement of user agencies in the government from the start of 
space applications development and subsequent validation. User’s representatives were 
incorporated in the management hierarchical structures to provide user viewpoints for future 
mission planning. To further expand the scope of marketing Indian space services and products 
of the ISRO in the international arena and to also foster the participation of the nascent industries 
in space commercialization, the Government of India in 1992 formed the Antrix Corporation, a 
commercial arm under the auspices of the Department of Science.   
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Over time Antrix has developed into a one stop shop for international clientele, catering 
to diverse needs ranging from small space components, IRS satellite imagery, to deliverance of 
sophisticated satellite systems into orbit.  Structured as a private limited company, Antrix’s 
alliance with the American firm Space Imaging Inc. has cornered 20% of the global market for 
remote sensing data.  Over 20 ground stations, spanning USA, China, Germany, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, UAE, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Myanmar and so on directly access data from 
IRS satellites. Furthermore, the recent establishment of an alliance between Antrix and EADS 
Astrium, the European satellite manufacturer to jointly market and manufacture commercial 
communication satellites in the international market will further offer India opportunities to 
enhance its commercial space portfolio. The past remains true in terms of the space launch 
market being the reserve of the Americans and Europeans. Entry into this lucrative arena of 
commercial space offers considerable challenges due to restrictions placed by major space 
powers like the US.  The launch industry is also subject to stiff competition and overcapacity.   
 
Antrix has made preliminary forays into the launch market by providing low-cost launch 
services for petite satellite systems in piggyback mode. ISRO has successfully launched satellites 
for Argentina, Germany, Korea, Belgium and Indonesia in this mode by PSLV. In 2007, the 
PSLV performed a full-fledged commercial launch of Italian scientific satellite AGILE by 
placing it into a near equatorial orbit. The launch capacity of the Indian space program is 
growing with new more powerful launchers under development, such as the GSLV III, with an 
indigenous cryogenic upper stage engine. This will propel India into the ambit of a select few 
nations with the ability to launch heavy satellites into geosynchronous orbit.  However, many 
challenges remain for the nation as global space commerce will be driven by low cost 
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accessibility to space, geopolitical developments, international political and security imperatives, 
and technological advancements (Murthi, Sankar, & Madhusudhan, 2007, 1815-1817).   
China 
  
After the several successful launches of the Long March 3 rocket, China broadcast its 
intention to join the commercial space launch business.  In 1985, astronautics minister Li Xue 
made the formal announcement to offer the Long March series to the West for placing 
commercial comsats into geosynchronous orbit.  Little interest was shown by the Western 
companies until 1986, when within a span of a few months, America’s two leading rockets 
exploded (Titan and Delta) and the Challenger space shuttle was lost.  Additionally, Europe lost 
an Ariane 2 rocket due to technical difficulties.  Many of the companies that had relied on 
America and Europe for commercial space transport for their satellites were left with no 
alternatives but to use Russia’s Proton or China’s Long March (Harvey, 2004, p. 115).   
 
Majority of the communications satellites requiring launch services are built in the U.S. 
or include U.S. components, hence require U.S. export licenses for satellites to be launched from 
China. The United States played the critical role in the evolution of the Chinese commercial 
space launch business. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan approved the first export licenses for 
three satellites to be launched from China, only if China met certain conditions.  The conditions 
entailed China sign three international treaties regarding, among other things, negotiating a fair 
trade agreement with the U.S. pertaining to commercial launch services; liability protection 
against satellite damage from space launches and agreement on satellite technology protection 
while the satellites were in China.  
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The Chinese met all conditions by January 1989. During this time all export license 
requests were under the purview of the State Department.  However, the occurrence of the 
Tiananmen Square uprising in June 1989 led to President George Bush suspending the export 
licenses for the three satellites. Ultimately, the suspension was lifted and the satellites were 
successfully launched by China.  This incident underscored the immense dependence of China’s 
commercial space endeavor on the West, particularly America and America’s near monopoly on 
the commercial launch business.  Chinese space launch services business was hostage to the 
whims of US political-military power, examples of which were common throughout the 1990s, 
when export licenses were granted, suspended and reinstated based on the political situation. In 
1997, serious allegations surfaced that China was benefitting its militarily space efforts by 
obtaining useful information by launching American satellites. The charges emanated from U.S.    
investigations into launch failures involving its commercial satellites where, Loral and Hughes,  
two U.S. companies possibly helped China in understanding the cause of the launch accidents 
and how to rectify them. In 1999, the State Department stopped granting further export licenses 
for commercial launches onboard Chinese rockets (Smith, 2003, p. 4-5).   
 
Nevertheless, an easing of tension between the U.S. and China and a commitment by 
China not to assist some nation in the development of ballistic missiles led to the State 
Department lifting of restrictions on Chinese launchers. However, the export regime made lifting 
of the ban an academic exercise (Harvey, 2004, p. 129).  The Chinese commercial satellite 
launch services have had small successes but have not yielded the penetration of the global 
market as had been aspired to.  China continues to launch satellites for a small sparse foreign 
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clientele; on May 14, 2007 for the first time China launched a home grown commercial satellite 
for a foreign buyer, Nigeria (Atkins, 2007, para 1-5).  
Historical Objectives 
 
India 
 
Since its beginnings, India’s space program has as its core focus, space applications. 
Even though national prestige was not the initial motivation for starting the program but has 
become overtime part of the program’s awareness.  As the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), New Delhi’s unique socio-economic space program enhanced its prestige among the 
member developing nations, symbolizing high technology achievements. For the domestic 
constituency, the program has retained considerable popularity; each successful space launch 
raises morale.  In addition to political domestic and international prestige, another politically 
guided goal of New Delhi’s space policy was the achievement of indigenous development, 
enabling the nation to explore and use outer space with its own space assets, without having to 
depend on external assistance that could compromise the autonomy of the space program. 
Following the war with Pakistan in 1971, the government upgraded the space program in mid-
1972. The ISRO was removed from the Atomic Energy Commission and placed under the 
auspices of the DOS.   
 
The increased activity within the ISRO coincided with the beginnings of working on 
India’s nuclear delivery, the ground tests of the SLV-3 in 1974-75 combined with its nuclear 
tests signaled New Delhi’s political intentions that India was ready to indigenously build a 
nuclear delivery system for it nuclear defense. The significant spin-off from the civilian space 
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program to the military occurred in the mid 1980s, when it emerged that the SLV-3’s first stage 
was used in the Agni ballistic missile. Currently, the missile program is handled by the Defence 
Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), and thus future missile spin-offs are unlikely to 
come from the ISRO’s launch vehicles. As the Indian economy liberalized in the 1990s, the 
goals of the ISRO expanded to include space commercial efforts. In 1992, the Antrix 
Corporation was established to offer ISRO’s space services on the international market. 
 
As in domestic politics, prestige played an important role in the space program; the 
commercialization of space assets enhanced the prestige further internationally. India’s space 
program has historically been active building relationships globally. The bilateral and multi-level 
cooperation with nations, space agencies and other international organizations derives India’s 
space program many benefits. In 2006, India and Russia reached an agreement that allowed India 
to be a partner in Russia's Glonass satellite navigation system (Joseph, 2006, para. 1). ISRO has 
a commercial partnership with EADS-Astrium of Europe to build and launch satellites for 
international customers. The Indian space diplomacy has allowed it to enhance trust, contribute 
to international space science and technology, access space tech, gain access to international 
markets for conducting space commerce and garner political influence for national interests.  
 
National interests may lead the international community to question India’s intentions for 
its space program. It is true that India’s launch vehicles and satellites have military and strategic 
applications but with the exception of the SLV-3 episode, they have no current military purpose. 
The launch vehicles and satellites can perform military functions but it is not practical. The 
PSLV and GSLV can be converted to ballistic missiles and the IRS and INSAT can offer 
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rudimentary defense reconnaissance and communications capability.  However,  during fueling 
the launch vehicles with liquid fuel will make them open targets, the resource satellites can’t 
provide high enough resolutions and day/night cloud penetration capability, and the 
communication satellite frequencies can be easily jammed; herein, these dual-use civilian space 
assets can provide limited, if any tangible assistance during a military conflict (Mistry, 1998, p. 
5-6).  India’s program has reached an advance level of sophistication, earning accolades for the 
recent lunar Chandrayan- 1 mission.  It brought the ISRO and India immense domestic and 
international prestige. There is a Chandrayan-2 robotic moon lander mission and manned 
mission in the works, leading to the possibility that India places less emphasis on historical 
socio-economic space projects.  
 
China 
 
Chairman Mao was a man on a mission, to gear China to once again be a strong power, 
able to develop independent of arm-twisting by world powers.  In that spirit, the cold war 
environment provided domestic political compulsion a ready environment to seek international 
prestige and territorial defense.  Beijing’s space policy has been guided by military compulsions, 
which it sees as critical to regaining its lost sense of historical greatness, its 'manifest destiny.' 
The military space program has been in modern times, a fast track to achieving Beijing’s 
'Mandate of Heaven.' Unlike, India’s space program that placed emphasis on civilian space 
applications from inception, China’s space policy expanded from its core military focus, later to 
provide socio-economic services to its people. Additionally, the program expanded to leverage 
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space commerce to showcase China’s space services offerings and enhance its international 
prominence. 
 
The seeking of international prestige has been more prominently associated with the 
Chinese space program than the Indians. For China, the mythical ‘Celestial Kingdom’ being 
reduced to the 'sick man of Asia' by the acts of imperialism, the recovery from this is part of its 
national narrative since Mao’s rise.  The attainment of space power status represents for the 
Chinese a modern ‘Celestial’ state. National and international prestige is not only essential for 
the recovery from historical offenses, but enhancing future standing (Delios, 2005, p. 4). 
International cooperation with other nations, space agencies and international organizations has 
been part of China’s space program from its inception. This cooperation has led Beijing to access 
technology to advance its space program. In the 1990’s, China received illicit aid from Loral, 
Hughes Aerospace and Lockheed-Martin that helped improve China’s launch capabilities. The 
technical assistance provided by Loral and Hughes corrected the guidance system of the Chinese 
Long March rockets, a launch system used by the military’s civilian front organizations, the 
China National Space Administration (CNSA) and commercial division China's Great Wall 
Industry Corp (CGWIC).  The satellite-launch data provided by the American space firms was 
also applicable to the guidance systems of intercontinental ballistic missiles (Chapman, 1998, 
para. 7-9). Eleven Chinese entities were sanctioned and the American firms fined due to the 
technical transaction.  
 
The main objectives of China’s space cooperation efforts have been to use the civilian 
face of the CNSA to access technology that can help its defense efforts in the space arena and 
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elsewhere, develop space commercial opportunities and to serve geostrategic aims through 
nuclear and missile technology proliferation. China has manufactured and launched satellites for 
Venezuela and Nigeria, as part of its recent space commercial efforts. For its geostrategic 
objectives of keeping Japan and South Korea in constant flux, it proliferated nuclear and missile 
technology to North Korea, as well as to Pakistan to keep India continually on the edge. Also, the 
space program has afforded Beijing enough strategic space to buy time in case of conflict with 
Taiwan, to have a decisive solution in its favor. China’s historical involvement in illicit 
proliferation continues unabated even though it and its entities have suffered sanctions under the 
MTCR regime.  Also, the nation and its space entities have received sanctions on dual-use 
technology imports The sanctions have not arrested the progress of the space program, possibly 
delaying it for a period of time, but never stopping its advancement. The Chinese have had three 
successful human spaceflights, Shenzhou V – VII and a Chang'e 1, lunar mission, enhancing the 
program’s prestige substantially.   
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 CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARISON OF INDIAN AND CHINESE SPACE PROGRAM 
 
Indian Space Program 
 
 The Indian program was meant to have a social impact, the uplifting of the Indian 
people. The program was also meant to help the nation leapfrog to advanced technologies and be 
used for two main purposes:  
• Enhancement of education and mass communications, particularly for rural people. 
• Appraisal and administration of the nation’s natural resources 
The mission and passion of Dr. Sarabhai continues to be part of the space program. However, 
while the program and its scientists are committed to projects that benefit the Indian people, they 
are exploring new horizons. One of the new horizons India is exploring is the moon, the surface 
of the moon. The Chandrayaan-1 spacecraft was launched on October 22, 2008 aboard the PSLV 
launcher.  Chandrayaan-1 carries aboard it 11 scientific payloads, five from India and six from 
abroad, including NASA, the European Space Agency and Bulgaria. The scientific payloads will 
map the minerals and chemicals on the moon, as well as prepare a 3-diemensional map of the 
total lunar surface. The lunar mission will also offer clues on the early origin of the moon 
(Subramanian, 2008, para 13). 
 
Reaching the moon has been a dream of Madhavan Nair, chairman of India's space 
program, which is using $1 billion per year on its space efforts, compared to an estimated $2.5 
billion annually by China. The successor of the $100 million Chandrayaan-I mission, the 
Chandrayaan-II, a cooperative effort with Russia, is anticipated to land a rover on the moon by 
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2012. The ISRO’S future plans include putting a man on the moon by 2020, followed by robotic 
missions to a nearby asteroid, Mars and the sun, a schedule more ambitious than China's 
(Hennock, Kushner, & Overdorf, 2008, 2). 
 
China’s Space Program 
 
China is concurrently considered a developing country and a world power. Many things 
remain a mystery about many spheres of China due to censorship and on many occasions much 
available public information is carefully orchestrated by the communist party. The same can be 
applied to China’s space program; many aspects about it remain shrouded in mystery. However, 
the reasons for the birth of China’s space program remain clear. Soon after the founding of the 
PRC, the Chinese space program was initiated.  Like the United States and the Soviet Union, 
China’s space program had at its genesis a military foundation and attainment of national 
prestige. The program had a military outlook and nuclear deterrence a critical component.  
 
Overtime, China has developed the status of a top-tier space program third in class after 
the U.S. and Russia.  The recent success of its astronauts’ first spacewalk, have fueled China’s 
ambitions.  The nation has embarked on advancement projects of developing a space station, 
manned moon mission by 2020 - 2025, building a space shuttle, and more. The space programs 
for both nations have grown to be power prestige fares. As India’s program has grown strength 
to strength, so has the regional rivalry between the two country’s space endeavors, the aim, to 
become the undisputed Asian space power. 
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The Beginning 
 
India: Upliftment and Development 
 
India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned a post-independent India using 
“planned development of an industrial society to eliminate poverty, provide social justice, 
create a self-reliant economy and assure national independence and security in world politics.” 
He wanted an India that was free of imperial western commercial exploitation, an industrialized 
India, politically independent and economically self-reliant. Nehru realized that to make India 
self-reliant, it would have to leapfrog in technology quickly, without having the luxury of 
progress over hundreds of years in development to have technological parity with the West. 
Technologies were the ‘temples of modern India,’ as Nehru referred to it; modern technology 
would uplift the Indian people from the ills that define third world status, hunger, poverty and the 
like, towards a path of self-reliance to guarantee the expansion of an independent industrial base 
that would then lead to national socio-economic development. 
 
Out of Nehru’s clarion call of independence and socio-economic development, the Indian 
space program discovered its roots, beginning in 1962 the program had a muscular sense of its 
importance in national development. Scientist Vikram Sarabhai, answered the prime minister’s 
call of secular socio-economic national upliftment.  Sarabhai was convinced that the space 
program, if it were to “…to play a meaningful role nationally, and in the community of nations, 
[it] must be second to none in the application of advanced technologies to the real problems of 
man and society” (Raja, 2006, p. 2). 
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China: Military and Prestige 
 
Shrouded in secrecy, since its inception, the world outside the corridors of civilian-
military intelligence agencies that keep tabs on the military activities of China, one gets its 
information on the Chinese space program from what the communist regime releases, the think 
tanks ponder, the academia publishes, the journalists investigate and the other world 
governments release publicly. What is known publicly about China’s space ambitions is that the 
program is an integral component of the military, an  outgrowth of Chairman Mao Zedong’s 
desire for the People's Republic of China (PRC) to become a become a nuclear power. Hence, 
China's space program was prompted in the 1950s by a choice to acquire nuclear weapons. The 
political compulsions behind this decision were driven by the twin imperatives of territorial 
defense and national prestige.  
 
China’s great leader, CCP Secretary General Deng Xiaoping, who was later to play a 
critical role in China’s history as the man to introduce market-driven reforms and open China to 
the world, addressed the nuclear matter succinctly. "The Soviet Union has the atom bomb. Where 
does the significance lie?" he asked in 1957. "It lies in the fact that the imperialists are afraid of 
it. Are the imperialists afraid of us? I think not . . . The United States stations its troops on 
Taiwan because we have no atom bombs or guided missiles" (Dellios, 2005, para 3). Even 
though, the Chinese leadership painted the West with the imperialist brush, they didn’t however; 
hide their own imperial intentions of military prowess, power politics and prestige by returning 
China to its mythical destiny as the ‘Middle Kingdom.’ 
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The Budget 
 
India’s Space Costs 
 
In the last four decades, the ISRO has developed competence in communications, remote 
sensing, broadcasting, meteorology, launch technologies and space science research. This space 
program has made significant contributions to several areas of national development. Due to 
direct and residual benefits of the space program upon improving the quality of life across India, 
the program continues to receive strong and unflinching political and public support. The 
national program has always strived to be as transparent as is possible, unlike China’s opaque 
space program.   India’s space budget is available to the public for observation and scrutiny.  
While the true costs of China’s civilian space program may be difficult to delineate from the 
military cost overlaps, the ISRO budgeting faces no such quandaries.  The ISRO prides itself as a 
thoroughbred civilian entity and goes to pains to delineate boundaries with the DRDO.   
 
Space is viewed as a catalytic investment, the ISRO awards funding and contracts to a great 
number of Indian industries that provide software and hardware to it.  ISRO also offers support 
to companies that supply value-added services using satellites and additional space 
infrastructure.  Hence, as the space program has expanded consistently, so has India's space 
budget over the years. However, recently there have been certain dramatic increases, the primary 
drivers of budget increases include:  
• Overall development of the Chandrayaan-1 lunar mission  
• Development of GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation (GAGAN), India’s navigation 
system  
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• Comprehensive development and launch of new INSAT satellites onboard Ariane-5  
• Evolution of the next generation of INSAT satellites, 4 metric ton class 
• Design, evolution, flight of new earth observation satellites onboard the PSLV  
• Development and production of the new cryogenic upper stage Geostationary Satellite 
Launch Vehicle GSLV Mk 3  
• Testing and development of the Space Capsule Recovery Experiment (SRE) atmospheric 
re-entry demonstrator capsule  
The ISRO budget has grown close to $1 Billion. It is quite amazing how much the Indians have 
been able to accomplish on a shoestring budget (Mohanty, 2008, p. 17). 
 
China’s Space Cost 
 
As China’s space program excels into new frontiers, questions keep arising about the cost 
of the nation’s space program.  The opaque space program has always been and will be an 
extension of the PRC military apparatus. Even though officially, the military and civilian space 
program separated as part of reorganization effort of the Industry of National Defense 
(COSTIND) and State Commission for Science. According to Sun Laiyan, administrator of 
China National Space Administration, the development of China's space industry is an annual 
￥2 billion, approximately $240 million (China, n.d.  para 2). However, realistically, it is into the 
billions of dollars, most estimates place the range at $1.5 - $2 billion (Cheng, n.d., slide 6). The 
Chinese manned space program costs through the first manned space flight on October 15, 2003 
have officially been registered at $2.5 billion, of which $1 billion went to infrastructure (Wade,  
n.d., para 28). By comparison the U.S. space program has an estimated annual cost of $17 
billion. 
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The Technology 
 
India  
 
The space programs of India and China are beacons for developing nations, in what they 
have been able to accomplish as developing economies and in the face of Western technology 
sanctions, restrictions and embargoes.  The two space programs may belong to the same 
continent but they developed from two separate focuses, one a military program, the other 
civilian. India’s space efforts started about a decade and half later than China but have caught up 
quickly.  Over the last four decades in the arena of space development, India has established 
capability in space applications (remote sensing, meteorology, and telecommunications), launch 
systems and ground operations.  
 
Historically, unlike China, India has focused exclusively on space applications.  The 
pronounced weight on space applications efforts are the major components of the Indian space 
program, while newer emphasis is being seen on prestige projects, such as space exploration and 
human spaceflight. According to Vincent G. Sabathier and G. Ryan Faith, space industry experts 
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “In technological terms, the Indian space 
program is roughly comparable to China’s program, except in human spaceflight and 
exploration” (Critical Questions: India’s Space Program with Vincent G. Sabathier and G. Ryan 
Faith, 2008, para 5).  
China  
 
The Chinese are a few years ahead of the Indians in human spaceflight capabilities and 
accompanying infrastructure. China has thus far, achieved status as a world class space program, 
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along with India.  China aspires to be compared to the US, when comparisons are made between 
space powers, such as ‘US versus Chinese space programs,’ this is a matter of national pride for 
them.  But beyond the propaganda value, domestic and international, the Chinese space program 
is more comparable to India’s.  The only opportunity for India to play catch up with China’s 
space program lies in manned space flight. Since 2003, China has launched three successful 
manned space missions with the latest one culminating in Zhai Zhigang becoming the first 
Chinese to "set foot" in the outer space for 20 minutes on September 27, 2008 (Backgrounder: 
Major breakthroughs in China's manned space program, 2008, para 7).  It is not a question of 
whether India has the technological capability of pursuing a manned space program but the 
desire to do so.    
 
India is not as demonstrably ambitious as it northern neighbor in terms of international 
prestige. From India's space program’s inception, four decades ago, a manned mission has not 
been undertaken. Instead main emphasis has been to use the space infrastructure on building 
satellites and rockets that have socio-economic applications, especially for the benefit of the rural 
areas. The Chinese can learn from this more pragmatic approach and publicize space applications 
more heavily, in view of continued exploding social unrest in the poorer interior provinces. 
Herein, China’s grand nationalist projects should be promoted with as much fanfare as their 
practical space projects, like bridging the economic gap between the coast and interior. This 
would also place more weight behind China’s continuous pronouncements about its space 
program’s peaceful intentions (Dellios, 2005, para 25-27).  So while China is marginally ahead 
of India in the human spaceflight endeavors; India plans to bridge this technological gap with the 
first planned manned space flight by 2015.   
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Commercial Aspects 
 
China and India both offer international consumers commercial space services.  China 
provides space services through its China great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), the 
commercial platform of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and 
India through Antrix Corporation Limited, the commercial arm of Department of Space (DOS).  
 
Antrix  
 
Antrix was incorporated in September 1992 to promote commercial products and services 
from the Indian space program. The impressive array of achievements of the program over forty 
years provides Antrix a strong foundation to market space products and services to global 
customers. The company’s goal is to achieve considerable market penetration in the global space 
market; hence Antrix has made significant investment in efforts towards marketing space 
products and services, especially remote sensing data and services. The international marketing 
of Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) Satellite data products is performed via Space Imaging, USA.  
The stable partnership has expanded over the years, which has lead to a growing network of 
global ground stations that receive/process IRS data, as many as ten ground stations to receive 
IRS data around the globe.  
 
As per ISRO’s Annual Report 2007-2008, “Concerted efforts put in over the last one 
year have resulted in penetration of IRS data, particularly, Resourcesat-1, Cartosat-1 and 
Cartosat-2 data into new territories. Significant inroads have been made into new markets in 
Australia, Africa and Korea for IRS data access and sales. The Agreement with Australia has 
paved the way for a significant entry for down linking of IRS data into the Australian continent 
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and the southern hemisphere for the first time. Contribution of IRS data to the Eagle Vision 
programs has increased appreciably, thus drastically increasing the IRS data presence in the 
US” (Annual Report 2007-2008, 2008). Recently, Antrix entered an agreement that is expected 
to lead to increased IRS distribution over the African region. Antrix has major presence in the 
USA (10 stations) and Russia (4 stations). Even China receives Cartosat-1 data from the archive 
station at Svalbard in the Arctic Ocean. Major inroads have been made in offering INSAT 
transponder capacity for TV broadcasting applications encompassing, especially Direct-To-
Home (DTH) services, the leading market driver for transponder capacity.  
 
In 2006, EADS Astrium of Europe and Antrix signed contracts to market communication 
satellites for the international market. The alliance aims to offer the combined expertise of both 
companies in communications satellites to the market segment of around 4kW of payload power 
and with a launch mass of 2 to 3 tons. The combined European payloads and Indian platforms 
provide cost-effective and flexible solutions to telecommunications operators. The first triumph 
of this alliance was the awarding of the W2M satellite contract by Eutelsat Communications.  
Antrix has used its PSLV to provide launches to numerous foreign clients, the most recent being 
the record setting multiple launch of 10 satellites in one shot, two of them Indian, including the 
primary payload CARTOSAT-2A; the remaining were pico- and nano-satellites from nations  
such as Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands. Also, Antrix has reached an 
agreement with Europe's Arianespace to explore launch opportunities for small satellites using 
the PSLV. The company aims to capture between 5 to 10% of the international launch market in 
the coming years.  Antrix’s revenues have consistently grown since its inception, quite 
impressive by global space services standards.  This is due to the cost-effective services of 
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India’s space program, for example, Antrix is able to offer competitive prices for launch 
services, sometimes at a third of the cost of other international players.  The company’s revenue 
for the financial year 2006-07 was approximately $154 Million from launch services, leasing 
transponders and sale of remote-sensing images. The profit was roughly $24 Million post-tax 
(Mohanty, 2008, p. 22-23). 
 
China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) 
 
The China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) was established in 1980, as the 
global commercial space services arm of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation 
(CASC).  CGWIC is the singular commercial organization sanctioned by the Chinese 
government to offer global commercial satellites, launch services and conduct international space 
technology cooperation. The CGWIC uses the work horse Long March launch vehicle for the 
international commercial launch services market (CGWIC Overview, n.d., para. 1). The 
commercial viability was considerably helped with the illegal assistance of Loral Space & 
Communications Ltd. In 1996, Loral aided a Chinese investigation of the February 1996 crash of 
a Chinese Long March missile carrying a Loral satellite.  A 1999 congressional investigation 
determined that Loral gave China invaluable information that helped it improve its missiles 
(McMillan, 2002, para 1-8).  Since Loral’s help, the Long March hasn’t experienced any launch 
failures. The company has used the Long March to perform twenty-four commercial launch 
missions for thirty satellites and six piggyback payloads.  
 
In 2004, CGWIC signed numerous contracts for communications satellite in-orbit 
delivery with global customers based on the newly developed DFH-4 platform, a new milestone 
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for China’s satellite export business. Through its commercial initiative, CGWIC has formed 
close ties with satellite manufacturers and satellite operators across the globe (CGWIC 
Overview, n.d, para. 2).  While the CGWIC develops its primary space services business, as the 
main economic cooperation and international trade conduit for China’s aerospace industry, it has 
developed import and export capabilities in various areas.   According to the company, annual 
gross value of import and export is around $400 million. While the main import focus is on 
aerospace related technologies, exports are mainly of electronic and mechanical products, as well 
as furniture, ferrous metal, various machinery and chemical materials.  The export business spans 
the major regions of Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, South America, Australia and Pacific 
islands, included are almost sixty countries.  Since its inception, CGWIC's gross value of import 
and export has hit $7.2 billion (CGWIC Import-Export, n.d., para. 1-2).   
 
A lot has been made of the daring initiatives taken by China's space program, but it has 
not been able to translate it into a profitable success in the commercial space arena. This failure 
is most glaring in China’s inability to crack the Southeast Asian satellite communications 
market.  CGWIC has yet to secure a true commercial satellite transaction and is heavily 
dependent on government-to-government exchanges for the inadequate amount of satellite 
business it has conducted. Compare this to Antrix, which runs more like an independent private 
entity. As China came out of a prolonged period of inactivity of commercial satellite launches in 
2005, questions of the nation’s technological aptitude re-emerged a year later with the well-
publicized loss of Sinosat-2 due to a malfunctioning solar panel (Brown, 2008, para. 3). 
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 In November 2008, the space program’s reputation took another knock when a Chinese built 
satellite for Nigeria had major failure in geosynchronous orbit. The satellite designated 
NigComSat-1based on the Chinese DFH-4 satellite bus launched on May 2007 was meant to 
have a 15 year life span but only lasted 18 months in space (Nigerian satellite fails in space, 
2008, para. 1-5). At a cost of approximately $450 million to the Nigerian exchequer, this is a 
costly loss for a developing nation and it seems there was no insurance protection provided to the 
satellite. The DFH-4 bus is meant to form a foundation for new Chinese civil and military 
communications satellites, as well as international sales. Out of the four DFH-4 satellites 
launched so far, two have failed, the first being Sinosat-2 due to onboard failed electrical systems 
(Nigerian Sat Fails, 2008, para. 1-2). 
 
While China’s space business is still at its infancy, the failure of the Chinese made 
Nigerian satellite places further hurdles on the viability of its products. Other obstacles for 
China’s ambitious space business include China's satellite industry being an extension of the 
military apparatus, more established rivals in the international industry, mixture of unfavorable 
political factors and a disinclination of customers to spend on China's low-cost satellites, given 
the low number of "birds" it has in operation. Even with ambitious goals, China will have to be 
patient in order to build a reputation as a qualified and established commercial satellite supplier. 
Reputation and experience are necessary credentials before low price becomes the decisive factor 
(Brown, 2008, para. 4). Herein, the Indian commercial space endeavors have been successful, 
initially targeting the niche 600 kg payload launch market, a less competitive arena as the 
traditional space powers concentrate on the more lucrative bigger payloads. So far India has 
offered launch services at above or at market rates. ISRO’s first purely commercial launch on 
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April 23, 2007 included placing Italian satellite Agile in equatorial orbit well above market rate 
at $11 million.  The agency has launched foreign satellites before, light weight or micro-satellites 
piggybacked on the PSLV, with the primary load being an Indian satellite. However, the Agile 
launch was the first time a foreign satellite was the primary load.  
 
The second commercial launch of an Israeli spy satellite TecSAR ON January 21, 2008 
under a commercial contract was also at higher than market rates, according to some sources the 
cost was above $6 million for the 300 kg payload. Presently, ISRO gets 75% of their business 
from foreign customers (ISRO joins big league in space, 2008, para 1-19). The launch of the 
W2M satellite for Eutelsat Communications co-developed by EADS Astrium of Europe and 
Antrix failed due to an anomaly affecting the satellite's power subsystem six weeks after launch 
on December 20, 2008 (ISRO-built satellite fails in space, 2009, para. 1-4). This is a minor bump 
for the ISRO on its path towards developing more robust satellite services.  The ISRO has 
proven its satellite manufacture, launch and operational capabilities in the past, which have only 
been enhanced by the recent successful Chandrayan-1 technically complex unmanned lunar 
exploration mission.   
 
Additionally, as a constitutional republic, India faces no political reservation in the 
international community that would impede its getting contracts for its space services; India is 
broadly admired and seen as a force of good in the world order. According to Michael Griffin, 
NASA Administrator, ''Indian Space Organization is good, and more important than the 
facilities it is the quality of the engineers and scientists and the technicians. They have a great 
capability'' (ISRO joins big league in space, 2008, para. 16).  
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 The outsourcing of satellite production capability is in the works by the ISRO (except for remote 
sensing satellites), both for domestic and foreign consumption. In the next few years ISRO will 
start training manpower of some Indian private companies that currently supply components for 
ISRO missions. The agency will provide comprehensive training at its facilities.  According to 
ISRO director, “…we want the private industry to take over production of commercial satellites 
from us, leaving ISRO free to focus on R&D and pursue new technologies” (Madhumathi, 2006, 
para. 5).  India and China have both new launchers in development, the GSLV Mark III and 
Long March 5, that are near completion and more than double their payload carrying capability. 
Both will be able to offer more competitive launch solutions than the big three, USA, Europe and 
Russia. It will be a slow process but Indian and Chinese programs are ambitious, have the 
modern technical expertise and the infrastructure to take on the majors in commercial space 
services. 
 
Space Applications  
 
India 
 
As envisioned by Vikram Sarabhai, India has continued on the path of using space 
infrastructure for the socio-economic benefit of the people of India.  The space infrastructure of 
communication and earth observation satellites combined with the ground infrastructure offer 
value-added services to the people for:  
“fisheries, forestry, mining, soil conservation, water resources management, agriculture, 
environmental studies, oceanography, urban planning, public health,  infrastructure 
development, utilities management, rural development, tele-education & training, disaster 
warning and mitigation, satellite-aided search and rescue etc.”  
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 The following offer a brief description of the main space applications that are helping the Indian 
people uplift themselves: 
 
Telemedicine: India can offer world-class health infrastructure to its population in the 
metros and big cities, but the standards are yet to reach the majority of the population in rural 
areas. Telemedicine offers people in remote areas access to specialist doctors in a city with the 
capability to diagnose and treat illnesses from the comfort of their own hospitals. The 
Department of Science (DOS) telemedicine initiative was launched in 2001 and now the network 
encompasses large parts of India.   
 
The telemedicine systems given by the DOS include hardware and communication 
equipment, software, as well as satellite bandwidth. Hospitals and state governments use their 
funds for part of their manpower, infrastructure and maintenance. There are also clinic-on-
wheels with satellites that provide medical treatment to people for who a trip to the city hospital 
could be life-threatening. These care mobile units offer medical diagnosis in general medicine, 
diabetology, ophthalmology, cardiology, women, infant and children healthcare. The 
telemedicine network connects over 278 rural districts with top doctors in the cities. 
Additionally, 235 remote/rural/semi-urban hospitals connect to 43 specialty hospitals via 10 
mobile telemedicine units.  
 
Tele-education: Obtaining education has always been in the forefront for Indians, to that 
end, the DOS has implemented many tele-education initiatives over the years. Recently, the 
51 
 
EDUSAT initiative was launched in 2004, with India’s first “thematic satellite” EDUSAT 
dedicated solely for educational purposes. EDUSAT can deliver educational content via the 
following modes: video conferencing, computer conferencing, web-based instructions, one-way 
TV broadcast and interactive TV. The specially configured satellite helps create “interactive 
classrooms” by employing multi-media multi-centric system. The DOS has leveraged its space 
satellites as to service more than 2600 interactive classrooms and 27000 receive only classrooms 
totaling close to 30000 tele-education classrooms.  
 
Tele-communications: Television visited majority of Indians late, before 1980 average 
Indians had virtually no TV. The state owned Doordarshan was the only channel available in 
limited areas where lay scattered terrestrial transmitters. In 1982 India launched the INSAT 
satellite program which over time gave the nation increased meteorological and television 
coverage, over 20 communications satellites blanket India. Every type of local and foreign 
channels permeate the neighborhoods, even rural villagers can be part of the MTV generation.  
 
Remote sensing: The biggest pride of the Indian space program remains the network of 
remote sensing satellites. The network has produced immeasurable benefits from producing 
major breakthroughs in search and rescue, uncovering archaeological ruins, detecting climatic 
shifts, managing fisheries and forests and detecting water in the most barren regions of the 
planet. Today, India is only matched by the U.S. with comparable remote sensing capabilities 
(Mohanty, 2008, p. 18-19).  
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China 
 
 Remote sensing: The use of domestic and foreign remote-sensing satellites started in the 
early 1970s, which led to development and enhancements of satellite remote-sensing application 
technology for agriculture, forestry, meteorology, mining, oceanography, seismology, surveying, 
urban planning and water conservancy. The sphere of remote sensing applications and 
technologies are enlarging, a national satellite remote-sensing application system has taken 
shape.  Most notably China has strengthened the infrastructure facilities to support remote 
sensing momentum by establishing the National Remote-Sensing Center, National Satellite 
Meteorology Center, National Satellite Oceanic Application Center, China Resources Satellite 
Application Center and China Remote-Sensing Satellite Ground Station, as well as remote-
sensing satellite application and certification institutes applicable to cities, provinces and relevant 
state departments. The remote sensing data is playing a critical role in environmental protection 
and ecological construction, nationwide land resources surveys, as well as in major national 
projects, such as the Three Gorges Project, the South-North Water Diversion Project and the 
Project to Transmit Natural Gas from West to East.  
 
Tele-communications:  Satellite telecommunications and broadcasting technologies are 
developing rapidly, their application is becoming more extensive and an application industry in 
this field has taken initial shape. By the end of 2005, China had more than 80 domestic and 
international broadcasting and telecommunications Earth stations, and 34 satellite broadcasting 
and TV link stations. There are more than 50,000 Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) and 
some 100 satellite specialized communication networks. The advent and application of satellite, 
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radio and sister TV broadcasting services has improved the coverage and quality of the programs 
across China, chiefly in the rural countryside. Satellite telecommunications and broadcasting 
technologies play the critical irreplaceable role of uplifting rural villages through access to 
telephones, broadcasting and TV, technology that provides access to the modern world. An up-
and-coming satellite telemedicine and tele-education broadband network has been established. 
China has developed a maritime satellite communication network that covers the entire globe.   
 
Satellite Navigation: China has employed domestic and foreign navigation and 
positioning satellites to service and expand the national market for navigation and positioning 
services, which are doubling every two years.  The nation is making great strides in 
development, application and services of satellite navigation and positioning technologies. The 
technologies are being used in transportation, project surveys, earthquake monitoring, basic 
surveying and mapping, meteorological exploration, resources investigation, oceanic surveys and 
so forth (China's Space Activities in 2006, 2006, p. 4-5).  
 
So far, China has been advancing its space applications capabilities to provide benefits to 
its population. However, it is playing catch up to India in this realm, as New Delhi’s space 
program’s main focus from the beginning has been to use space technology for the benefit of the 
people.  In this arena, India is unique among the space faring nations.  
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International Cooperation 
 
India  
 
The Indian space program has always welcomed building relationships in the 
international sphere. ISRO has great interest in mutually beneficial exchanges, as well as great 
interest in offering services and expertise to developing countries in the applications of space 
technology. India has Formal Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or Agreements with 
Australia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, China, EUMETSAT, European Space Agency 
(ESA), France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, U.K., Ukraine, U.S.A and 
Venezuela.  
 
Major recent agreements signed are: 1) Memorandum of Understanding on Joint 
Activities in the Field of Human Spaceflight Program with Russia, 2) Implementing 
Arrangement for cooperation between India and Brazil regarding augmentation of a Brazilian 
earth station for receiving and processing data from IRS Satellites 3) Agreement between the 
ISRO and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency regarding cooperation in space X-ray 
observations, 4) Agreement of cooperation between the ISRO and the Russian Federal Space 
Agency (RKA) for Joint Moon Exploration.  
 
The successful Indian lunar mission Chandrayaan-1 of 2009 carried Indian instruments, 
as well as hosting two instruments from the U.S. and four from Europe. The future Chandrayaan-
2 mission will be jointly developed with Russia and contain an orbiter, lander/rover and 
scientific instruments from developing nations.  
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 Megha Tropiques, an Indo-French joint satellite mission to study of the tropical atmosphere and 
climate related to aspects such as monsoons, cyclones, etc., is progressing well. The MADRAS 
satellite will carry jointly developed ISRO-CNES instrument and two additional instruments 
SCARAB and SAPHIR will be given by CNES.  ISRO will launch and operate the satellite, 
collect and distribute the data. The cooperation will also entail validating and calibrating the 
instruments and analyzing the data. Additionally, ISRO and CNES have begun a joint satellite 
mission called SARAL for which CNES will supply an onboard relay instrument for the global 
ARGOS data collection system and a radar altimeter instrument called ALTIKA. ISRO will offer 
the satellite bus, launch and operations.  
 
The ISRO will carry aboard its OCEANSAT-2 an atmospheric sounder called ROSA 
from Italy as a component of the main payloads (ISRO Annual Report 2007-2008, 2008). ISRO 
and the Israel Space Agency (ISA) cooperation continues to blossom since India launched ISA’s 
most technologically advanced spy satellite, TECSAR on January 21, 2008 into polar orbit 
(Clark, 2008, para 1-3). The cooperation continues with the development of technical and 
scientific interfaces for flying an ultraviolet astronomy telescope from Israel called TAUVEX 
aboard the ISRO’s GSAT-4 experimental geostationary satellite. ISRO and the Canadian Space 
Agency (CSA) are developing an Ultraviolet Imaging Telescope (UVIT) planned on ISRO’s 
astronomy satellite ASTROSAT. India and Russia have reached varying agreements relating to 
cooperation in the development and use of GLONASS, the Russian version of the US GPS 
navigation satellite network. ISRO and the RKA have agreed to develop an experimental satellite 
called YOUTHSAT, university students from India and Russia will be involved in developing 
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scientific instruments and analyzing the data (ISRO Annual Report 2007-2008, 2008). ISRO also 
contributed an X-ray astronomy instrument for the Russian satellite called CORONAS-
PHOTON launched on January 30, 2009 (Koronas-Foton, n.d., para. 1).   
 
India continues to play an active role in multiple international bodies such as the 
International Astronautical Federation (IAF), the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (UN-COPUOS), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (UN-ESCAP), the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), the Inter Agency 
Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), the International Space University (ISU), the 
international COSPAS-SARSAT system for search and rescue operations, the Committee on 
Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), the Space Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG), the 
Coordinating Group on Meteorological Satellites (CGMS), the International Global Observing 
Strategy (IGOS), the International Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ISPRS), 
the Asian Association for Remote Sensing (AARS), etc. As a partner in the International Charter 
for Space and Major Disasters along with CNES, ESA, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and 
NOAA, ISRO is working with the additional partners in planning to provide satellite data for the 
natural disaster management.  
 
Sharing of Experience in Space (SHARES) is a system ISRO has developed that provides 
training in different applications of space technology to scientists from other developing nations. 
Under the auspices of the scheme, selected candidates will be given living expenses and 
allowances by the DOS, while the international travel costs will be borne by the sponsoring 
nation.  The UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UN OOSA) has been established in India, an 
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initiative which offers ten month post graduate diploma courses in Satellite Communication 
(every alternate year starting in July), Remote Sensing and Geographical Information Systems 
(every year starting in October), Space and Atmospheric Studies (every alternate year starting in 
July) and Satellite Meteorology and Global Climate (every alternate year starting in July). 
Following the coursework, candidates can carry out research in their respective country for one 
year leading to an award of a Master’s Degree from the Andhra University (ISRO Annual Report 
2007-2008, 2008). 
 
China 
 
China has signed bilateral cooperation agreements on the use of outer space for peaceful 
means and space project cooperation agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, the ESA and the European Commission.  Also China has 
established joint commission schemes or space cooperation subcommittees with Brazil, France, 
Russia and Ukraine. Space cooperation memorandums have been signed with space 
organizations of India and Britain, as well exchanges with space-related bodies of Algeria, Chile, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Peru and the United States have been exercised. China has enhanced 
collaboration with Brazil on the Earth resources satellite program. The successful launch of the 
Sino-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite 02 in October 2003 has led to further signing of 
supplementary protocols on the joint research and manufacturing of satellites 02B, 03 and 04.  
Further cooperation is envisioned in expanding data application of Sino-Brazilian Earth 
resources satellites regionwide and globally.  
 
Under the auspices of Sino-French Joint Commission on Space Cooperation, China and 
France have developed wide-ranging space cooperation and exchanges in Earth science, life 
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science, space science, satellite application and satellite TT&C. The historic space cooperation 
between China and Russia continues to produce results. Within the framework of the Space 
Cooperation Sub-Committee of the Committee for the Regular Sino-Russian Premiers' Meeting, 
many exchanges have come to fruition, the latest being in the sphere of manned spaceflight. 
China’s manned space program infrastructure has benefitted immensely from Russian 
technological help.  China has space exchanges and cooperation with Ukraine under the auspices 
of the Sino-Ukrainian Joint Commission on Space Cooperation.  China and the ESA have 
cooperated in the “Dragon Program,” related to Earth observation satellites.  Thus far, they have 
conducted remote-sensing application projects in the fields of agriculture, disasters, forestry, 
meteorology, oceanography and water conservancy (China's Space Activities in 2006, 2006, p. 
9-10). China, along with six other nations is an active participant in the European Union’s 
civilian Galileo satellite navigation project.  
 
On December 16, 2008, the representatives of China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand formally inaugurated the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 
Organization (APSCO), an organization headquartered in Beijing.  The organization aims to 
promote multilateral cooperation in space science and technology amongst its members. Member 
nations will cooperate in research and development, space technology application and training of 
space experts (Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization starts operation, 2008, para. 1-3). 
Additionally, China continues to support the Asia-Pacific Region Multilateral Cooperation in 
Small Multi-Mission Satellites Project. Beginning in 2007, China started working with 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia and Thailand on research, 
manufacture and application of small multi-mission satellites.  
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 China actively encourages, supports and participates in the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS).  China has acceded to the "Agreement on the 
Rescue and Return of Astronauts, and on the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Convention on the Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space and Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects." China has also acceded to a disaster mitigation mechanism 
encompassing space organizations from various nations in the light of the Charter on 
Cooperation to Achieve the Coordinated Use of Space Facilities in the Event of Natural or 
Technological Disasters.  China has participated in programs promoting the use of space for 
sustainable development in Asia and the Pacific organized and implemented by the UN 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (China's Space Activities in 2006, 
2006, p. 10).  
 
China and India place deep  importance on bilateral and multilateral relations with space 
agencies and space related bodies with the purpose of defining international constructs for 
exploitation and utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes, aspiring to new scientific and 
technological challenges, reforming and refining space policies and building and strengthening 
ties between nations. 
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Manned Space Program 
 
India 
 
The ISRO has set its sights on setting up a manned spaceflight program.  This is a 
relatively recent development for the Indians, truly making the space program a robust one. In 
February 2009, the Government of India authorized $2.5 billion to launch its first astronauts into 
space by 2015. The decision was arrived at after the highly successful launch in October 2008 of 
India’s first unmanned lunar mission, Chandrayaan-1, which is now orbiting the Moon and 
mapping its terrain in 3-D. The lunar mission has catapulted India into an elite club, with 
members United States, Russia, Japan and China, as the only nations capable of independently 
reaching the Moon (Page, 2009, para. 1-4).   
 
Also, the ISRO and the RKA have decided to work together to share critical equipments 
for the Indian manned lunar mission. India and Russia signed a MoU to promote joint activities 
in the arena of human space flight program. Under the MoU, both nations will jointly build 
spacecraft for the Indian manned mission, based on the Soyuz capsule. As per the MoU, an 
Vimanaut (an Indian astronaut) will fly to space aboard a Russian spacecraft within the next five 
years, eleven years after China and ahead of ISRO’s maiden human space flight to the Moon by 
2020, four years before China’s target mission date (ISRO, Russian Space Agency join hands for 
Indian Man Mission, 2008, para. 1-2).  
 
China 
 
China sent its first taikonaut (Chinese astronaut) Yang Liwei into space in 2003 aboard 
Shenzhou-5. In 2005, a two-man mission carrying Nie Haisheng and Fei Junlong to space, a tour 
lasting five days. In September 2008, a trio of Shenzhou-7 taikonauts, Liu Boming, Jing Haipeng 
61 
 
and Zhai Zhigang orbited the earth for three days with Zhai becoming the first Chinese to "set 
foot" in outer space. His spacewalk lasted about 20 minutes and is believed to help pave the way 
for the country's next space mission-- the launch of a space lab or space station (Backgrounder: 
Major breakthroughs in China's manned space program , 2008, para, 6-7).  China is planning a 
manned moon mission between 2020 and 2025.  
 
Traditionally, India has focused almost entirely on space applications, an exploration and 
human spaceflight being relatively new. According to the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, the Indian space program is almost equivalent to China’s program, except in manned 
spaceflight and exploration (Critical Questions: India’s Space Program with Vincent G. 
Sabathier and G. Ryan Faith, 2008, para. 5). Both nations have ambitious human spaceflight 
programs, yet to be fully realized.  
 
Space Policy 
 
India 
 
Space policy is irrevocably part of national politics, an extension of it; it cannot be 
viewed in isolation. The national mood, domestic-international politics, social mores, national 
security, moment in time, history and more play critical roles in the establishment of a national 
space program. Nehru’s vision that space science and technology could be used to spur 
development was unique in the Sputnik era. This policy was novel in its concept, especially in 
the Cold War arena, when the superpowers (and later China) propagated national space programs 
out of the military prism. The Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) was 
established in 1962 to counsel the government on space policy and cultivate international 
cooperation. The official birth of India’s space program came in 1972 with the establishment of 
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the Space Commission, which was entrusted with the role of reviewing “the development and 
application of space technology and space sciences in terms of promoting India’s national 
development” (Sheehan, 2007, p. 145). This outlook considerably predated United Nations’ 
recognition of the possibility space technology had for third world nations, when it noted, “space 
technology can be a powerful tool to accelerate national development; it provides a way of 
leapfrogging over obsolete technologies and getting away from percolation and trickle down 
models of development for which developing countries do not have the time” (Sheehan, 2007, p. 
145 - 46). Several policy factors drove the development of the Indian space program. A newly 
constituted sovereign state, a nation borne out of colonial bondage, New Delhi sought 
technological independence from the constraints posed by more technologically advanced 
nations.   
 
The Nehruvian domestic policy called for developing space applications for socio-
economic progress, initially to develop national mass communication capabilities, particularly 
broadcasting, and to use resource satellites to monitor and manage the nation’s natural resources, 
ensuring productive use. Other space policy considerations included acquiring the international 
prestige that would accompany a space program; however, this was limited in scope as a 
motivation in the beginning (unlike China). In addition to economic dividends accrued from a 
national space program, successive governments to India encouraged the policy of bypassing 
intermediate technology and go immediately to the high technology arena; space technology was 
the high tech arena. A cornerstone of the space policy was the strong belief that India would not 
let itself ever be isolated from the economic and social benefits of advanced technologies, as it 
had been in the past, isolated from the benefits of the industrial revolution. India did not have the 
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luxury to master intermediate technology first, while advanced nations had already mastered 
high-end technology, and by the time India mastered high-end technologies, the developed 
nations would have already mastered the next generation of technologies such as nano 
technologies, leaving India always one-two steps behind.  Herein, India had to leapfrog in space 
and other technologies as to maintain the same level of technical abilities as developed nations or 
leave as little deficiency as possible in technology between it and the technically advanced 
nations.  
 
Cooperation with the advanced space powers was critical to the beginning of India’s 
space efforts and later to its policy with emphasis on indigenous development of space and other 
technology. International space cooperation was an important component of India’s space policy, 
as it allowed it to access know-how and technologies that had the possibility of accelerating the 
progress of its space program. Also, the dependence on one nation for access was lessened as 
India endeavored to cooperate with a number of nations simultaneously (Sheehan, 2007, p. 146). 
India’s space program has attained a level of self-sufficiency comparable to other national space 
programs, providing India a role in establishment and implementation of international space law, 
as well the opportunity to cooperate with other space powers and organizations as an equal 
partner. The nation has been strategic in its space policy, as to cooperate with a broad range of 
countries and groups, thus lessening the chances of comprising its independence, a posture of its 
non-aligned status.  Global space cooperation being a critical policy of India is an avenue for 
developing Indian influence, leveraging space commerce opportunities and enhancing its 
prestige by demonstrating is technological sophistications by working with other advanced space 
powers. Unlike China, India has a clearly delineated civilian space program and a military 
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missile program. In the past, technology from the SLV-3 launch rocket was implemented in the 
Agni ballistic missile, as well some space scientists left in the early 1980s for the ISRO to go 
work for the DRDO on the IGMDP. However, India’s policy has been to maintain a wall 
between the civilian ISRO and the defense entities. The ISRO prides its civilian badge and is 
keen to avoid international sanctions on its activities. This doesn’t mean that under the cover of 
national security, civilian space technology know-how is not provided to the defense 
establishment.  
 
Like other space nations, India’s launchers and resource and communication satellites can 
serve dual-use technologies purposes. In case of India, since it has an independent missile 
program, the launch vehicles wouldn’t serve a practical platform for a missile. Additionally, 
India is developing dedicated military satellites because the IRS and INSAT series can only 
make a limited contribution in conflict. In the last two decades, India’s space policy has been 
also driven by security needs, as the traditional dichotomy of development and security have 
been merging to  encapsulate a broader definition of security beyond military terms to include, 
environmental, economic, human and societal security (Sheehan, 2007, p. 155).   
 
Beyond security and national development, India’s space program is a reflection of the 
success of the nation and its people, while able to compete with space powers in an area that has 
huge economic, human capital, infrastructure and high technology demands. Also, New Delhi’s 
space policy is a vital component of its foreign policy, which is aimed at enhancing its role as the 
dominant power in the Indian Subcontinent and among the developing nations.  The outlines of 
space policy are subject to values; in terms of India, using technology for national development, 
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these values are correlated with community expectations.  In this regard, India can claim to be 
the most cost-effective advanced space program, a standing accomplished by limiting its 
ambitions and steering clear of wholly prestige projects (Sheehan, 2007, p. 156). This may not be 
the case in the 21st century. 
 
In the new century, India’s space program has expanded its focus, adding components of 
space exploration and manned spaceflight, a new direction markedly different than the vision of 
Vikram Sarabhai. The chairman of ISRO, G. Madhavan explains the additional space policy 
direction, “The policy – pronounced four decades ago by Vikram Sarabhai, father of India’s 
space programme – had to change for two reasons. We believe that pushing forward human 
presence in space may become essential for planetary exploration, a goal we have set for ISRO 
twenty years from now. Secondly, with India’s booming economy, costs should not be a hurdle” 
(Sheehan, 2007, p. 157). It has become evident that prestige has become an important factor in 
space policy considerations, as is maintaining parity with China. However, space applications 
remain at the core of the space program, belying assumptions that the quest of prestige will 
dictate policy at the expense of socio-economic development. India didn’t initiate its space 
exploration and manned programs independent of the activities of other space powers such as 
China but as a reaction to them; as such if militarization of space becomes a reality, India will 
not be far behind.  
 
China 
 
The motivations of China’s space program are sometimes difficult to discern due to the 
opaque nature of the program. However, over the years Beijing’s space policy has been decoded, 
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discernable by its space activities as more is written about the program. The nation’s initial space 
policies are the product of historical wrongs and of the cold war environment. Chairman Mao 
realized in order for China to achieve great power status and the accompanying prestige, it must 
be strong militarily, a critical component being the development of nuclear tipped missiles. 
China would never be subject to past indignities by conquering foes, instead the nation would 
strive to be a strong, independent nation. Herein, space policy was forged out of nationalist and 
militaristic notions. Not unlike the US and the Soviet space programs, China sought to build 
missile capacity and enhance its international and domestic prestige.  
 
Prestige is critical in world affairs, and the space program is one tool of obtaining it. The 
space program has grown to be an important lever in the CCP’s domestic policy arsenal, using 
space success to incite national flames and to unify the people. In the last two and a half decades, 
there has been more emphasis on space applications for socio-economic benefits.  The policy 
goal of expanding the military space program with a civilian mix is used for accelerating national 
development.  In addition to improving the life of the common man, the space program gives 
China the capability to develop high technology and scientific infrastructure. Like India, China’s 
space policy was directed at leapfrogging to mastering high technology in order to gain parity 
with the technologically advanced nations. The space program’s policies are manifold which 
include military projects, civilian space applications, obtaining the latest science and technology, 
economic competitiveness, geopolitical aims and enhancing prestige. Domestically, the space 
policies help elevate the stature of the CCP, thus allowing to win the backing of the people and 
making easier the sustainability of the communist regime. The hosting of the 2008 Olympics at 
Beijing was a seminal moment for the Chinese people, that of ‘having arrived’ at the world stage.  
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Similarly, the space program inspires the same pride and prestige, as ‘having arrived,’ 
particularly after the recent Shenzhou manned space missions.   
 
Internal policies have led to a militarily muscular China, using the various missile 
armories as currencies of power and prestige. The CCP has cleverly overtime, intimated to the 
people its policies, now they are one in the same. For it is, the people have overtime been 
inculcated with the party line, that China’s world power status and prestige are an entitlement, 
payback for historical insults, an inevitability towards achieving manifest destiny of the mythical 
‘Middle Kingdom.’ In its quest to acquire supreme power, China’s space policies and activities 
can be viewed by the adage, ‘by any means necessary,’ irrespective to its legality, moral or 
ethical norms. In the international arena, its geopolitical policies have included illicit 
proliferation in nuclear and missile technology, the latter borne from its space program. In its 
quest for domination of Asia, its myopic geostrategic policies have led it to proliferate nuclear 
and missile technology to North Korea and Pakistan, among other nations. These nations have 
acquired the missiles, targeted them at competitors of China. Pakistan flexes its Chinese missiles 
at India, thus forcing India to expend economic and other resources on defense that could be 
used toward national development.  This prohibits India realizing its full potential, partially 
inhibiting national development due to being chained down by terrorist antics of its neighbor to 
its west.  
 
Pakistan, a nation so economically feeble, that it survives day-to-day on US economic aid 
and IMF loans; has held India hostage to its whims by terrorist acts for over twenty five years; 
such audacity by Pakistan is only possible because it possess the nuclear and missile umbrella, 
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technology provided by China. This nuclear boogey used against India, has handicapped India 
into taking decisive action against a state sponsor of terrorism.  These are the same tactics being 
employed by China in East Asia, against Japan and South Korea.  Beijing uses its proxy North 
Korea to make threatening statements and missile tests to keep Japan and South Korea on edge 
as to avoid them from being future challengers to China’s dominance in Asia. China doesn’t 
want a reunification of the two Koreas, a unified Korea has the potential to become a power rival 
to China. However, China’s grand designs have backfired on the Indian Subcontinent and East 
Asia. Pakistan has been recognized for what it is, an economic basket case and the most 
dangerous nation in the world, as it is a den of world terrorism backed by nuclear weapons.  Due 
to this threat from the west and the north, India has developed advanced indigenous nuclear and 
missile programs, self-reliance in space and one of the most advanced military, without 
sacrificing its national development. This is the direct result of China’s actions of attempting to 
gain strategic depth in the Indian Subcontinent, to stop India’s rise. 
 
The myopic policies have led to Japan strengthening its space program and 
reconnaissance capabilities. Recent North Korean shenanigans have revived the mood in Japan 
for having an official offensive military capability and a stronger military role in region; there is 
even talk of Japan buying or developing a missile defense system to protect against potential 
North Korean missiles. The Korean imbroglio has led South Korea to enhance its own military 
capabilities by purchasing the latest weapons from the US, developing advanced indigenous 
military weapons such as high tech naval destroyers and starting its own space program. The 
intentions of PRC’s geostrategic policies were to weaken its neighbors, but it has had the 
opposite effect, it has emboldened and strengthened them. For it is, Japanese military expansion, 
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stronger US military presence in the region, or a Theater Missile Defense System (TMD) in 
Japan and Taiwan would counter Beijing's influence in the area and possibly affect its designs on 
Taiwan; these are real possibilities in the future (Cooper & Contant, n.d., para 7-8). Proliferating 
missile technology derived from its space program allows China to achieve influence in those 
nations, so does overt international cooperation.  Cooperation with other nations, space agencies 
and international organizations permits Beijing to build relationships for soft power influence 
and easier access to high technology and know-how. Also, cooperation opens opportunities for 
space commerce, to offer China’s launch and satellite services. In its efforts to be considered a 
peer to the US in space efforts rather than a more apt comparison with peer competitor India, 
prestige has continued to be central. This has led China to broaden its space policy to include 
planetary exploration and human spaceflight. Still Beijing’s space policies are primarily dictated 
by military and prestige considerations. This will continue to be underlying theme of China’s 
space policy in the future as it pursues its ‘Mandate from Heaven.’ 
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 CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNATIONAL ARENA AND POLITICS 
 
Why Start a Space Program 
 
India  
 
The setting up of the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station in 1963 marked the 
beginning of the Indian space program. The Department of Space (DOS) and the Space 
Commission were established by the Government of India in 1972 to pursue united development 
and application of space science and technology for national goals. ISRO was set up as the 
research and development arm of the DOS to execute India's national space program. The Indian 
space program is world class, comparable to the best there is in its areas of focus. It enjoys 
unwavering political and public support due to the program’s emphasis on space applications for 
improving the quality of life of the ordinary Indian (Mohanty, 2008, p. 5).  
 
The economic upliftment of Indians through space applications are still the underpinnings of 
the Indian Space Program.  In his autobiography Wings of Fire, former rocket scientist and 
President of India Dr. A.P.J. Kalam states, that the vision for the Indian Space program was 
unambiguous, “…if the Indians were to play a meaningful role in the community of nations, they 
must be second to none in the application of advanced technologies to their real-life 
problems..[with] no intention of using it merely as a means to display our might” (Kalam & 
Tiwari, 1999, p. 43).  The Father of the Indian Space Program, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, a visionary 
who laid the seeds of the ISRO, displayed to the nation the upliftment benefits of a space 
program through an experiment in which a leased American satellite was used to broadcast 
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educational and health television programs to inexpensive ground stations in 5,000 remote 
villages of India. The key areas of focus of the Indian space program have included:  
• Remote sensing for resources survey & management, meteorological services and 
environmental monitoring  
• Satellite communications for distance education, telephony, mobile communications, 
television broadcast, radio broadcast, satellite-aided search & rescue, telemedicine, 
meteorology etc.,  
• Development and operation of native satellites launch vehicles, satellites and ground 
systems for offering these services (Mohanty, 2008, p. 5).  
 However, there is a past connection between the ISRO and the defense establishment, In July 
1983, India embarked upon an Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) 
pursued through India's Defense Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL). The DRDL is 
part of the military research and development machinery, the Defense Research and 
Development Organization (DRDO).  During the early years, when headed by Vikram Sarabhai 
and Satish Dhawan, ISRO time after time opposed any military application for its dual-use 
ventures such as the Satellite Launch Vehicle 3 (SLV-3). Ultimately, however, the DRDL did 
borrow technology and experts from the ISRO. In a move resented by the ISRO community, 
Abdul Kalam left the ISRO, as manager of the SLV-3 project to head India's missile program at 
the DRDL. Nevertheless, the degree of human resource transfer from the ISRO and DRDL 
should not be overstated – hardly a dozen scientists left with Kalam from the ISRO to the DRDL. 
Kalam used his experience with SLV-3 to design the 2,500-kilometre-range Agni (Fire) missile 
using the SLV-3's first stage.  
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India's space and missile programs have followed very diverse projects. In addition to the 
Agni series, the IGMDP included development of the 150 to 250-kilometre range ballistic 
missile Prithvi, surface-to-air missiles Akash (Fire, 25-kilometre range) and Trishul (Trident, 9-
kilometre range) and Nag (Cobra), a "Fire-and-forget" anti-tank missile. IGMDP missiles don’t 
realistically resemble ISRO's sounding rockets or launch vehicles, which theoretically could’ve 
been converted for use as short-range and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Over the years 
many experts have suggested that the GSLV could be converted to an intercontinental ballistic 
missile but the ground realities and logic have proved them wrong, India’s military has not 
pursued that path. Additionally, outside of India there have been attempts to link the civilian 
ISRO to the DRDL/DRDO by insisting that certain ISRO technology or projects have potential 
military implications, military potential doesn’t necessarily translate to military use or 
involvement. This is even truer when one traces the motivations for creating the Indian space 
program. Herein, while both organizations use technology from the same domestic industrial 
base, ISRO and DRDL have pursued very dissimilar rocket agendas (Mistry,1998, p. 153). There 
is a clear delineation between the civilian space program and the missile program. The Indian 
space program has been unique in the world’s space programs in that it first was borne out of a 
need to help its people improve economically and socially. 
China 
 
The period following World War II was a tumultuous one, in Europe, postwar 
rehabilitation and territorial distributions amongst the allies was the main international focus. 
Meanwhile in the Pacific, Japan was recuperating from a nuclear holocaust in Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima, other devastations, as well as facing an occupation by the victor, the United States. 
Japan’s Pacific neighbor China had witnessed devastations of World War II and Chinese civil 
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war. The Chinese leaders were acutely aware of the military disparity between their nation and 
the West, particularly in missile technology.  Their primary interest lay in possessing ballistic 
missiles capable of reaching far flung targets. The imperative to developing missile technology 
was intimately related to China’s sense of insecurity to a perceived hostile environment.  China 
had confronted Cold War superpowers, Soviet Union and United States.  
 
The United States had threatened China with possible nuclear attack at the end of the 
Korean conflict in the form of a direct secret threat by President Dwight Eisenhower. On 
numerous occasions the US violated Chinese airspace for reconnaissance and flying aggressively 
to test the nation’s air defenses.  Herein, the above activities combined with memories of the 
Opium Wars, led Chairman Mao to the conclusion that only a nuclear deterrent through missile 
delivery systems would guarantee the security of the newly founded Peoples Republic of China 
(PRC) against hostile powers.  He also wanted the accompanying power and prestige that such 
weaponry would provide China in the international sphere (Handberg & Li, 2007, p. 57). Hence, 
it becomes evident that the space program arose out of military necessity, following in the 
footsteps of the United States and the Soviet Union whose space programs were the result of 
pursuit of missile technology.  
 
 
Present Dimensions 
 
India 
 
The current Indian space program is an economically and technologically efficient 
integrated program, self-reliant and applications driven, preserving critical relations to the user 
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community and committed to the pursuit of scientific excellence in the peaceful use of space for 
the benefit of the common man. The space program has proven capabilities in producing world-
class satellites and launch vehicles, and applying them in assorted areas pertinent to national 
development. India has established two operational space systems. The Indian National Satellite 
(INSAT) system is at present composed of ten satellites in orbit, the largest domestic satellite 
communication system in the Asia Pacific and one of the largest in the world. The Indian 
Remote Sensing satellite (IRS) system, with a collection of eight satellites is regarded as one of 
the best constellation of satellites in the world for providing information on natural resources. 
Space launch vehicles developed indigenously by India provide the nation high degree of 
autonomy in launch capability to orbit these classes of satellites. The Polar Satellite Launch 
Vehicle (PSLV) is the workhorse of the space program well proven through thirteen successive 
successful flights and it offers the capability of placing 1.4 tone class satellites in polar sun 
synchronous orbits. The Geo- synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) is capable of 
launching 2 to 2.5 tone class of satellites into geo-stationary orbit. The GSLV as inventory 
makes India one of the six countries in the world with the ability to place payload in 
geosynchronous orbit.  
The Indian population has benefited immensely due to progress in national development 
from space applications. The Indian satellites provide television broadcasting, radio 
transmission, rural area communications, business communication, tele-education and 
telemedicine. Data and images from the IRS satellites are used for monitoring agricultural crops, 
to seek zones for availability of ground water, rural development, planning water shed, offering 
advisories to costal fishermen on possible fishing zones, waste land and disaster management 
programs. Additionally, the satellites aid in relaying cyclone warnings, support search and 
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rescue, gather meteorological data and help weather forecasting for emergency communication 
during disasters.   
Advanced scientific investigations are being carried out in the fields of astronomy, 
climate research using satellites, atmospheric sciences, sounding rockets, balloons and ground 
instruments.  Also, India successfully launched the Chandrayaan-1 robotic mission to map the 
moon surface on October 22, 2008. The mission has received international recognition for its 
scientific achievements; over a two-year period, it will survey the lunar surface to produce a 3- 
dimensional topography and a comprehensive map of the moon’s chemical characteristics. 
Chandrayaan-1 is the flagship mission of an ambitious planetary exploration program.  The 
ISRO has also received preliminary government funding for setting up the foundation for the 
Indian human spaceflight program. 
The DOS’s commercial arm Antrix Corporation has been successful in commercially 
promoting the space assets of the ISRO and helping Indian space industries become globally 
competitive. International marketing of IRS images and data, launching of foreign satellites by 
PSLV, supply of reliable satellite systems and sub-systems, mission support services of Indian 
ground stations, execution of telemedicine networks in various parts of India and leasing of 
INSAT transponder capacity to commercial operators are few of the highlights of the Antrix 
space enterprise. It also has an alliance with EADS Astrium to jointly manufacture 
communication satellites using the INSAT bus for global commercial markets. The first example 
of this cooperation was the manufacture and launch in 2008 of the W2M satellite for Eutelsat 
Communications.  
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India has enhanced bilateral co-operative arrangements with more than 20 nations including 
Australia, China, France, Germany, Russia and USA. The level of the international co-operation 
is multi-dimensional in form, which includes exchange of meteorological data, carrying out of 
joint missions, offering opportunity for payloads onboard Indian satellites, and education and 
training in the area of space. Recently, in the spirit of international cooperation in space, India 
carried six payloads from other international space agencies including NASA, ESA, and the 
Bulgarian Aerospace Agency free of cost as part of Lunar Mission Chandrayaan-1. In affiliation 
with United Nations, India established the Centre for Space Science, Technology and 
Application Education for Asia and Pacific in 1995 and continues to offer well-structured 
educational space programs to researchers from various countries of Asia (Kasturirangan, 2006, 
p. 3-5).  
The ISRO continues to build cooperation with universities, academic institutions, and the 
private sector in various areas of research, manufacture, and sub-contract projects related to 
space science, applications and technology. The unique approach to the application of space for 
the common man is still at the core of the Indian Space Program while the natural evolution 
towards discovering the frontiers beyond Earth has begun.   
China 
 
China's space industry has progressed mightily, having many achievements. Several 
research and development design, production and testing bases of international caliber have been 
built, noticeably enhancing the country's fundamental capabilities in space science and 
technology. As a developing nation, China has made historic breakthroughs in manned 
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spaceflight and has embarked on a broad lunar exploration project. Space application systems 
have been maturing as applications have expanded and benefits enhanced.  
 
In recent years, China has indigenously developed and launched over 22 different types 
of man-made satellites, increasing its technological skills in this field markedly. China operates 
several series of satellites -- broadcasting and telecommunications satellites, "FY" (Fengyun, or 
Wind and Cloud), recoverable remote-sensing satellites, "DFH" (Dongfanghong, or The East is 
Red), scientific research and technological experiment satellites, "ZY" (Ziyuan, or Resources), 
meteorological satellites, "SJ" (Shijian, or Practice), Earth resource satellites, the oceanic satellite 
series (Haiyang) and "Beidou" (Plough) navigation and positioning satellites. In addition, the 
oceanic satellite series will come into being soon. Substantial progress in key space technologies 
has led to China’s critical independence in satellite development. Recently, on April 15, 2009 it 
launched its second satellite for the Compass navigational network, the Compass G2 satellite. 
The Chinese launch vehicle Long March series has become the workhorse of the space program. 
The latest in the series, Long March 5 is under development.  
 
The fields and scale of satellite technology has led the Chinese to enlarge its small space 
applications program. Remote-sensing, telecommunication, broadcasting and navigation and 
positioning programs have been constantly expanded. China regularly uses remote-sensing 
application systems in the fields of agriculture, disaster mitigation, environmental protection, 
forestry, land mapping, meteorology, mining, oceanography, surveying, transportation, water 
conservancy, regional and urban planning. Satellite data plays an important role in major 
national projects such as, the Three Gorges Project, the South-North Water Diversion Project and 
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the Project to Transmit Natural Gas from West to East. The field of satellite telecommunications 
and broadcasting has taken shape providing more extensive access. The transmissions are 
providing villages access to broadcasting and TV.  
 
A satellite telemedicine and tele-education network offers rural communities access to 
services denied earlier. China’s current maritime satellite communication network ranks among 
the advanced nations in the application of global mobile satellite communication. China has 
implemented several major related projects, one of which is called "industrialization of satellite 
navigation and positioning applications." By employing domestic and foreign navigation and 
positioning satellites, China has made great progress in the development, application and 
services of satellite navigation and positioning technologies. The range and fields where satellite 
navigation and positioning are applied are being continuously expanded and the size of the 
national market for satellite navigation and positioning is doubling every two years. Satellite 
navigation and positioning technologies have been widely used in transportation, basic surveying 
and mapping, project surveys, resources investigation, earthquake monitoring, meteorological 
exploration, oceanic surveys, and so forth.  
 
"The key thing that China wants out of its space program writ large is prestige," says 
Dean Cheng, and China Specialist at the Center for Naval Analysis Corporation (Iannotta, 2008, 
para. 8).  The Chinese space program originally evolved from the Maoist leadership's drive to 
attain nuclear missiles, which in turn provided the essential launch vehicle for a simple satellite. 
Intense nationalism coupled with international recognition and prestige were additional 
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motivators behind China's fledgling space policy. Today, China’s space efforts have yielded a 
high degree of technological sophistication without losing sight of past motivations.  
 
Future Dimensions 
 
India 
 
The quest for space frontiers is fresh in the minds of the ISRO team after the successful 
implementation of India’s first lunar mission, Chandrayan-1. A second Chandrayan mission is 
already in the planning stages to be deployed to the moon by 2012. The mission will include a 
land rover that collects rock and soil samples from the surface of the moon for analysis. 
Planetary explorations are likely to follow the current success of the complex Chandrayaan-1 
undertaking; plans include missions to Mars and Venus, fly-by asteroids and comets. The ISRO 
has received official government sanction and preliminary funds for the initial planning of 
manned space flight by 2015 and lunar manned mission by 2020. Also, the indigenous cryogenic 
upper cryogenic stage Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle mark III (GSLV –III) is 
planned to have its maiden flight in 2010. By 2011, the Indian GPS Aided Geo Augmented 
Navigation or GPS and Geo Augmented Navigation system (GAGAN) is planned for 
implementation; a regional Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) is set to be fully 
deployed. Seeking to break away from the rocket launcher technology of the 20th century, India 
is developing a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV), a forerunner of the Indian version of a space 
shuttle that uses scramjet engine technology, allowing the spacecraft to achieve hypersonic 
speeds of upto Mach 8. A RLV technology demonstrator is expected to be flown sometime in 
2010. 
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Is the Indian Space Program deviating from its commitment of using space technology 
for the benefit of the common man? Or is it simply a natural extension of a space program 
graduating to the next level of technological progress?  The Indians are deeply committed to 
space applications for economic and social benefits; however, they see manned spaceflight and 
space exploration as necessary elements of developmental progress, even for a developing 
nation.  The question is not, can developing India with high level of poverty afford to have such 
ambitions but the real question is how it cannot afford not to pursue such options. 
The Indians were denied the benefits of the industrial revolution by their British colonial 
masters, while the West developed and harnessed all the benefits of industry, India languished, 
trying to play catch up in the 20th century. The nation is still paying a heavy price, economically 
for purposefully being isolated from the industrial revolution by the British Raj. Indians want to 
follow independent and sovereign decisions with regards to national development; this extends to 
space policy as well.  Herein, Chairman of the ISRO, Dr G Madhavan Nair puts it succinctly, 
"Twenty years from now, when space travel is likely to become mundane like airline travel 
today, we don't want to be buying travel tickets on other people's space vehicles" (Bagla, 2008, 
para. 40). India doesn’t intend to be an idle spectator of the space revolution and it benefits.  
China 
 
Recognized as the third most prominent space program after US and Russia, China has 
future plans to gain parity with the two superpowers.  In that endeavor, China is building upon a 
strong foundation of space technology. It has significantly expanded the horizon of Compass 
(Beidou) navigation and positioning program from its inception with regional scope to a global 
player. The new system will expand from the current constellation of 5 satellites to 35, which 
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include 5 geostationary orbit (GEO) satellites and 30 medium Earth orbit (MEO) satellites, 
offering complete coverage of the globe by year 2015. The network will provide two levels of 
service, licensed service for the military and free service for those in China (Compass Beidou 
Overview, n.d., para. 1-2). Formally, China has declared a three-step program for its manned 
spaceflight program: launching taikonauts into space, accomplished with Shenzhou V, VI and 
VII; a space laboratory, and eventually a space station (Johnson-Freese, 2007, p. 14). The future 
space station named The Tiangong I, or Heavenly Palace I will have a core module, two 
experimental modules, a manned spaceship and a cargo spaceship. According to Qi Faren, chief 
designer of the Shenzhou spacecraft, the Tiangong I is planned for launch before 2011 
(Dingding, 2009, para. 1-5). A space shuttle or space plane is under development but the details 
at all levels about the program are minimal and opaque. However, a more powerful Long March-
5 (Chang Zheng 5) launcher is expected to debut in 2014.  
 
The Long March 5 once in service will use less fuel for the same amount of payload 
having the second largest carrying capacity behind the Delta 4 Heavy (Long March 5 Will Have 
World's Second Largest Carrying Capacity, 2009, para. 1-5). Another area of importance is 
China’s military space pursuits. On January 11, 2007, the Chinese shocked the world with an 
anti-satellite test with the intentional destruction of China's Fengyun-1C weather satellite via an 
anti-satellite (ASAT) device (David, 2007, para. 1-2). The test was an awakening moment for the 
world about the level of sophistication China’s space program had achieved. The ASAT test 
raised the specter of weaponization of space and the true future intentions of the Chinese space 
program.   
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Due to the opaque nature of the Chinese space program, the intent of future Chinese space 
capabilities has at many times been difficult to judge, leading to wide-ranging speculation. Some 
experts proclaim that the PRC plans to build a space-based intelligence gathering system 
analogous to that of the United States. Others suggest that the PRC will maintain focus on dual-
use systems, stressing launcher development over satellite manufacturing. It is even expressed 
that the real motivation for the Chinese focusing on enhancing launch capabilities, rather than 
satellites, is because their satellite fabrication capabilities are so poor (China’s Space Program: 
Civilian, Commercial, & Military Aspects, 2006, p. x). China’s 2006 white paper on national 
space activities states: 
 
“The aims of China's space activities are: to explore outer space, and enhance 
understanding of the Earth and the cosmos; to utilize outer space for peaceful purposes, promote 
human civilization and social progress, and benefit the whole of mankind; to meet the demands 
of economic construction, scientific and technological development, national security and social 
progress; and to raise the scientific quality of the Chinese people, protect China's national 
interests and rights, and build up the comprehensive national strength…To remarkably improve 
the country's capabilities and reliability of carrier rockets in space; to build a long-term, stably 
operated Earth observation system, and a coordinated and complete national satellite remote-
sensing application system; to set up a relatively complete satellite telecommunications and 
broadcasting system, and remarkably enhance the scale and economic efficiency of the satellite 
telecommunications and broadcasting industry; to establish a satellite navigation and 
positioning system step by step to meet the demand, and bring into being China's satellite 
navigation and positioning application industry; and to achieve the initial transformation of 
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applied satellites and satellite application from experimental application type to operational 
service type” (China's Space Activities in 2006, 2006, p 2-7). 
 
The above listed developmental goals and aims of the Chinese space program exclude the 
military underpinnings of the program. Technically, in the recent past, China has separated its 
space program into a civilian and a military one. However, most likely this is a superficial 
change for international consumption, as this would unnaturally assume that the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) would voluntary give up control to any area of the space program that is 
critical to its future force projection. While the PRC has issued the White Papers on space in 
November 2000 and October 2006 that detail aims, progress and accomplishments, conjectures 
linger about Beijing’s true objectives in space. While capabilities are at most times not difficult 
to gauge, it can be hard to discern intentions. About 95% of the broad space program has 
technology that is dual-use providing value to the civilian and military arenas, the questions 
remain as to the true goals of China in space. Not unlike the U.S., China’s space technology is 
for military as well as civilian use, the Compass navigation satellites have the same dual-use 
nature as remote sensing, with possible force enhancement applications providing improved 
situational awareness to missile guidance. Space will be exploited by China to reap all benefits, 
civilian and military in the future (Johnson-Freese, 2007, p. 6-9). On balance, most probably 
China will continue to modernize and enlarge its military space capabilities; however, Beijing’s 
reliance on space for both civilian and military purposes will amplify with time. Nevertheless, 
due to budget constraints, China will continue to focus exceedingly on dual-use space 
technologies that serve domestic socio-economic and military objectives (China’s space 
capabilities and their impact on U.S. national security, 2008, p. 8).   
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 It is an open secret that China wants to gain parity with the U.S. in space, as well as deny 
the US space dominance within its current capabilities, a possible reason for the ASAT test in 
2007. ASAT and other military space assets could be enhanced in the future to deny an enemy, 
strategic operational space during warfare.  This is especially true for a more advanced rival such 
as the US, in case if Taiwan hostilities breakout. China’s space assets and asymmetrical 
capabilities could be used against the much stronger U.S. to leverage time and enough strategic 
space to accrue decisive action against Taiwan in a China-Taiwan conflict scenario. Also, the 
same space capabilities can be leveraged against its peer competitor India in case of conflict.  As 
a developing nation, a restricted budget restrains the depth, breadth, and time frame of its space 
program. Due to other national economic, environmental and social developmental objectives, 
pursuing certain expensive space technologies can yield negative returns in the near future. At 
best, China will pursue a pragmatic path to enhance upon current space technologies in parallel 
with developing cost-effective asymmetric military space capabilities, such as ASAT, 
information centric warfare, etc. to deny a much more advanced rival like the US from 
dominating space. At worst, Beijing will resolve itself to becoming a military space power in an 
attempt to take full advantage of having freedom of action in space.  
 
Are Indian and Chinese Space Programs Role Models? 
 
How to define a role model? If you look it up in a dictionary it means, “a person who 
serves as a model in a particular behavioral or social role for another person to emulate or a 
person whose behavior in a particular role is imitated by others.” If the developing world were 
given a choice, to emulate: a democratic nation, law abiding, transparent, accountable to its 
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people and a force of stability in the comity of nations or a totalitarian military dictatorship, 
unlawful, secretive, unaccountable to its people, domestically oppressive with a horrific human 
rights record, nuclear and missile technology proliferator and a force of destabilization in the 
world; who would they choose? Is the logical choice, a democratic India? Even though, the space 
program is part and parcel of the nation’s ideals and what it stands for, the space program must 
be judged on the merits of providing benefits for the society viewed from an apolitical prism.  
In the first 4 decades of its space program, the ISRO went to space not to gaze at the stars, but to 
look back to Earth. Even though, the ISRO operates at one-twentieth of NASA's $16 billion 
annual budget, some would argue that on a daily basis the ISRO makes its advances more 
accessible to its citizens (Carney, 2006, p. 2). India’s space program is unique among space 
powers in that it truly represented ideals of performing deeds to uplift its people out poverty so 
that the common people could have the same opportunities as the more fortunate, the complete 
socio-economic upliftment of its citizens. The Indian space program is an extension of the vision 
of Vikram Sarabhai. The space program is transparent; ISRO’s annual report is available to all 
on its website. When one compares the ISRO’s website and the information contained on China 
National Space Administration’s (CNSA) website, the level of transparency becomes glaring.  
 
In an open society, the ISRO is accountable to its people, to the government and its 
activities open to further scrutiny by an independent national media. ISRO prides itself as being 
truly a civilian program. According to D. Raghunandan, executive secretary of Delhi Science 
Forum, a nonprofit technology and science think tank on the topic of ISRO’s civilian credentials, 
"ISRO badly wants to preserve its civilian identity and isolate itself from any possible (U.S.) 
sanctions…There may not be the impenetrable firewall that the U.S. wants, but there is pretty 
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much a separation between the Defence Research & Development Organisation and ISRO" 
(Carney, 2006, p. 2).  
 
Meanwhile, there is no clear delineation between China’s military and civilian space 
program. China’s space assets are owned by Beijing and are directed by the civilian CNSA. Up 
until recently, the CNSA was under supervisory control of the Commission for Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).  In March 2008 COSTIND was 
merged with the newly created Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and 
reconstituted as the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National 
Defence (SASTIND), and hence, the CNSA enjoys strong ties with China’s military. Moreover, 
the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the China Aerospace 
Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) perform research, development and manufacturing of 
state space equipment, under the supervision of CNSA. In reality, the China Academy of Launch 
Vehicle Technology (CALT), a central institute within the CASC, is the key lab for not only 
Launch vehicle technology, but ballistic missile development as well. The military or the PLA 
supervise launches and satellite tracking control through the China Satellite Launch and Tracking 
Control General (CLTC), a division of the PLA’s General Armament Department.  
 
What’s more, on the occasion of the Shenzhou 3 launch on March 15, 2002, President 
Jiang Zemin proclaimed that the Shenzhou venture held enormous importance for the 
modernization of China’s defense (Ogawa, 2008, p. 23-24).  Essentially, the CNSA is a civilian 
front organization for liaison and international cooperation between the PLA and the Chinese 
defense community. China space program and strategic expert Kevin Pollpeter sums it up 
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concisely, “China’s space program is inherently military in nature…. Indeed, China’s space 
program is a military-civilian joint venture in which the military develops and operates its 
satellites and runs its infrastructure, including China’s launch sites and satellite operations 
center” (China’s space capabilities and their impact on U.S. national security, 2008, p. 3). 
 
Since the space program represents the ideals of a nation, China’s space program began 
with military aspirations. Even though the space program in the last two decades has expanded 
space applications to provide economic, social and technological benefits to its society; the 
program still remains under military control. As the Chinese nation is not an open society, still 
secretive, the space program remains nontransparent. The true intentions of the space program 
are still opaque. Since the PRC is not accountable to its people, neither is its space program. The 
space program is held accountable to the military and by extension to the communist party. The 
media is not independent in China, so it is unable to fill the void of being a voice of 
accountability for the people as are its media peers in India and the West. Even though 
proclamations are made by China that its space program is for peaceful purposes such as by 
Deputy general manager of the China Space and Technology Group, Xu Dazhe, “China has 
undertaken the space program for scientific and technological progress, so that mankind could 
make better use of space resources for peaceful purposes,” it should be warily accepted by the 
international community (China's Space Program Is for Peaceful Use of Resources, 2005, para. 
4). If one is to judge the space program as a role model for developing nations, the criteria most 
important is the use of space for socio-economic upliftment. A space program that concentrates 
on socio-economic space applications only and doesn’t divert national economic funds for 
prestige projects on space explorations and human spaceflight is a true role model based on this 
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strict criterion. Surely, the latter programs are important for expanding the space scientific 
understanding of man and have residual benefits as enhancing the scientific technological base of 
a nation, but these programs don’t address the pressing needs of a developing nation. A 
developing nation needs what space applications provide: resource development, broadcasting, 
communications, telephony, radio, tele-education, telemedicine, disaster and natural resource 
management, weather management, and more.  
 
India took the lead in the beginning as being committed to only providing socio-
economic benefits by using space technologies and China followed recently in this endeavor. 
However, both developing nations are expanding their respective programs to space exploration 
and manned spaceflight which don’t derive socio-economic benefits to the extent as space 
applications. The true ideals of economic, societal and technological benefits provided by space 
applications to its entire people are only worth emulating by other developing nations. Herein, 
using the strict criterion of the role model, India and China are no longer role models even 
though they still expend funds on space application programs.   
 
Domestic Politics 
 
India 
 
The birth of India's space program was partially guided by political motivations. Over 
time it came to symbolize India's modern technology achievements, thus boost India's prestige 
internationally. Traditionally, the Indian space program has catered to a domestic constituency, 
enhancing its monumental popularity with the Indian people, for whom each successful mission 
swells national morale and pride (Mistry, 1998, p. 155). This was most evident with the 
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Chandrayan-1 mission, the public, media, and government officials showed their strong support 
by following the mission from its launch to its trek to the moon with hypnotic zeal. The 
moonshot not only enhanced the nation’s brand value but also deluged the ISRO with more than 
135,000 applications for 300 job openings, an unprecedented feat for an organization that 
receives an average of 4,000 – 5,000 annual applications. Chandrayan’s success has prompted 
the demand for jobs in the ISRO, according to V Jayaraman, director of ISRO’s Hyderabad-
based National Remote Sensing Agency, he further stated, “The organization has acquired a 
glamour value thanks largely to the moon mission” (Laxman, 2009, para. 1-4). 
 
The chief objective of India's space policy was to achieve self-reliance, giving the nation 
an ability to pursue an independent course in exploring and using outer space with its own 
satellites and launch vehicles, without relying on foreign technical assistance which could detract 
from the sovereignty of the space program and its policies. ISRO enjoys large amount of 
autonomy in developing particular systems, the choice has been mainly technical rather than 
politically determined.  The organization simply uses the fastest available technologies in quest 
of its goals, for example, it built the PSLV's liquid-fuel engine based on designs of France's 
Viking engine and importing a cryogenic engine from Russia for the GSLV (Mistry, 1998, p. 
155). 
China 
 
China has risen out the ashes of an imperialist past, determined not to let history repeat 
itself. For it is, China longs for the path towards the status of the mythical ‘Middle Kingdom,’ its 
space program is an important avenue to realizing its mythological rightful standing in the world.  
A critical component of attaining the ‘Middle Kingdom’ is the prestige that accompanies it. 
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China’s space program is an extension of its national aspiration for power and international 
prestige. The CCP’s political objective is to stay in power, one of the tools it uses to stay in 
power is by flaming the nationalist pride among the public and another way is to have successful 
prestige projects such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics for which the CCP can take credit for.  
Herein, in order to retain its legitimacy in the 21st century, an era of increasing irrelevance of 
communist ideology, a majestic project like the space program becomes a unifying force, a 
source of prestige and pride of what China can do. Like a magician trick, the CCP focuses public 
attention on a prestige project such as space exploration; meanwhile behind the scenes it carries 
out official corruption, social injustice and other misdeeds, allowing the party to escape scrutiny.  
 
The manned space mission of Shenzhou V to VII received great domestic and 
international media coverage, moments of great pride for the Chinese people. The taikonauts of 
the three manned missions were celebrated as national heroes. President Hu Jintao proclaimed 
the launch of Shenzhou V as reflecting gloriously on the motherland. The space program 
provides military, economic, social, medical, educational and technological benefits; however, 
the CCP never loses the opportunity to take the glory for the programs achievements. (Dellios, 
2005, p. 4-5).  
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International Arena 
 
India 
 
The space program began in 1962 within the post-colonial model for a developing nation 
based on ideals of self-reliance, rapid economic growth through industrialization and social 
justice.  By the 1990s, the space program grew more ambitions, evolving from a program solely 
focused on socio-economic upliftment to space technology commercialization, coinciding with 
the momentous changes of the political economy away from socialism and towards a liberalized 
market oriented model (Political Economy and ICTs for Development: India’s Space Program, 
1975-2000, 2006, p. 1). This offered new opportunities to the Indian space community to 
strengthen existing bonds and build new relationships in the international arena. One of the most 
unlikely relationships developed as a result of the opening up of the economy, that of Israel’s 
strategic relationship with India, quite remarkable for country with the second largest Muslim 
population in the world, after Indonesia.  In 2008, Israel eclipsed Russia as the largest defense 
equipment seller to India. The evolution of the relationship from military to civilian space 
cooperation has led India to launch several satellites for Israel, the TECSAR reconnaissance 
satellite being the latest one, launched in January 2008.  As mentioned above, India’s level of the 
international cooperation is multi-dimensional, including exchange of meteorological data, 
carrying out of joint missions, offering other nations opportunities for payloads onboard Indian 
satellites, and education and training in the area of Space. This cooperation has the added benefit 
of space diplomacy in exerting soft power, allowing New Delhi to build influence within the 
other nation through the relationships built through scientists, scientific exchanges, commercial 
involvement, inter-governmental committees and other forms of space diplomacy.  
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In addition to the accessing international prestige, space diplomacy can have foreign 
policy spin-offs. ISRO can provide PSLV, IRS and INSAT services to other nations, hereby re-
enforcing existing or building new economic and political ties with nations. Already, India 
markets IRS images around the world. Additionally, the Chandrayan-1 not only raised India’s 
stature and prestige internationally, but also earned the goodwill of the U.S., Europe and 
Bulgaria, along with their respective space agencies. The Chandrayan-1 mission carried 
scientific payloads from these countries free of cost. Furthermore, the dual-use nature of the IRS 
and INSAT series of satellites demonstrates that these space assets can greatly enhance India’s 
force multiplication and power projection capability in the Asiatic region, especially affecting 
the regional strategic balance in New Delhi’s immediate neighborhood (Mistry, 2001, p. 1042-
43). A recent study, based on two reports: “the 2008 Space Competitiveness Index” issued by the 
Futron Corporation and the “Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity,” released by the 
Space Foundation of Colorado, concluded that India and China, along with Japan, Russia and 
Europe are set to end U.S. space dominance in the future. Futron’s report states the historical 
advantages the United States enjoyed in all three major dimensions of space competitiveness, 
human capital, industry and government are being narrowed by emerging world powers India 
and China, as well as a resurgent Russia, collective Europe, and a stable Japan (India and China 
set to reduce US dominance in space activity, 2008, para. 1-7).  
 
Futron Corporation’s Space Competitiveness Index (SCI) uses fundamental economic 
determinants of space competitiveness across 40 individual metrics to ascertain national space 
competitiveness in three major dimensions: human capital, industry and government. This 
approach permits Futron Corporation to generate an exhaustive comparative analysis of ten 
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foremost nations in space and space-related activity. The SCI results show US is still the present 
leader in space competitiveness, followed by Russia, Europe, China, and India (Insight: The 
Futron Space Competitiveness Index, 2008, para. 7-12). India’s space program has enhanced 
New Delhi’s stature; the program’s technological, commercial and socio-economic progress 
could further facilitate India’s currency in the international arena.  
China 
 
China’s international image is critical to its rise towards world power status. The CCP 
uses its carefully controlled media managed strategies to portray itself and the nation only in a 
positive light. Meanwhile, it goes to great lengths to counter or subvert any negative portrayal of 
China and its activities, anything that might hurt its domestic and international prestige. This 
type of propaganda and media management is reminiscent of the former Soviet Union but 
China’s is more advanced and sophisticated. The space program is a great tool for enhancing 
China’s prestige. Since the inception of the space program, China has been engaged in 
international space development cooperation. In recent years, China has been involved in a 
number of cooperative projects and international initiatives. To forestall overt and covert fears in 
the international community about China’s role in space militarization, Beijing's diplomacy has 
been carefully orchestrated. In 2002, China and Russia jointly submitted a working paper to the 
UN Conference on Disarmament that would ban weapons in space (Dellios 2005, p. 4-5).  
An important undertaking of international cooperation has been with Brazil, the China-Brazil 
Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program, a technological cooperation program in which both 
nations develop and operate Earth observation satellites. As part of its manned Shenzhou 
mission, China entered into cooperative arrangements with Kenya and Namibia to erect tracking 
stations within their borders (Ogawa, 2008, p. 27). Similar to China’s use of international 
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cooperation in climbing up the scientific, engineering and technological ladders and maximizing 
resources and building soft power relationships with other nations to benefit it, the space 
program is no exception.  
 
The international cooperation efforts in the area of space are testament to China’s space 
diplomacy. China has done well in establishing a network of space partnerships. It has partnered 
with Russia for guidance and technical assistance on its prestigious manned space flight 
program. There are several ventures China has with Europe, including Galileo navigation and 
positioning program and communication satellite development, with Canada on space science, 
relationships with Nigeria and Venezuela on sales of Chinese commercial communication 
satellites and various ventures with a number of developing nations as well. Actually, China is 
attempting to supplant India and establish itself as the leader of the developing nations in all 
areas, including the space arena (Johnson-Freese, 2007, p. 17). China doesn’t want any regional 
competition in the space arena, in the near future seeks to become the premier space power in 
Asia. This was the main driving force for establishing the regional multilateral space cooperation 
initiative, APSCO in 2005. It seems the partnership was accelerated by the success of China’s 
manned spaceflight program, and it reflects China’s eagerness to proactively take the lead in 
space efforts in Asia (Ogawa, 2008, p. 28). As China’s space efforts continue to grow, it will 
continue to exploit space activities as a diplomacy tool, an indispensible part of enhancing its 
national security but international prestige as well. 
 
 
 
95 
 
Inference of Space Policy thru Space Budget 
 
India 
  
“India is not going to allow on the Asian continent for a Chinese capability that they don’t 
have,” stated confidently NASA administrator Mike Griffin in his speech before the Space 
Transportation Association on January of 2008 (Foust, 2008, para. 2).  The statement pertains to 
the frontiers of human spaceflight, an acknowledgement that the next nation to launch humans 
into space is going to come from India not Europe or Japan. India’s Planning Commission gave 
approval in February 2009 for RS. 12, 400 crore ($2.5 billion) to be used towards the manned 
space mission, scheduled for 2015. Whether this reflects an expansion of the civilian space 
program or a permanent shift in priority from the traditional national development program 
remains to be seen. However, the allocation of $2.5 billion is slightly double the annual budget 
of the DOS; one can deduce that clearly India is moving beyond space applications for the 
common man to space frontier exploration. This is a significant development for New Delhi’s 
space policy. 
 
Since the 1990s, India’s space program has been in a state of transition. The foundations 
of the space program laid in practical applications of advanced space technologies for socio-
economic development. Initially, space was a primer for helping raise the economic profile of 
India’s citizens, not as an instrument of prestige. The country eschewed other forms of space 
activities such as, human spaceflight, robotic space exploration and the like in favor of 
applications like remote sensing and communications that provided practical benefits. 
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The unique approach towards national development has been highly successful for the 
developing nation. In a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
January 2008, Madhavan Nair reviewed the accomplishments of the ISRO in benefitting the 
national development endeavors from disaster and natural resource management to expanding 
national broadcasting and communication coverage, as well as supporting telemedicine and tele-
education to rural areas. Nevertheless, the chairman stated, “I can confidently say that that vision 
of Dr. Sarabhai has been fulfilled…Today, we are at a turning point. We are looking at what’s 
next.”  He further elaborated that the Indian scientific community, “…came to the unanimous 
conclusion that space is going to be the next frontier of humankind…It’s not only just looking at 
the planet Earth and trying to understand it and look for new resources in a very efficient 
manner for improving the life of other people, but space exploration will also play a very major 
role” (Foust, 2008, para. 3-7).  
 
The success of the Chandrayan-1 lunar mission has garnered immense prestige and 
confidence for Indians.  For it is, space exploration is a new realm within the space program and 
the success of its first official exploratory mission has provided the ISRO enough confidence in 
its abilities to take on more technically complex missions in the near future. Before future 
projects can be implemented, it is important to evaluate the budget of the Indian space program 
to see if space policy inferences can be made. The following are the total budgets and their 
allocations (detailed budget in Appendix B and C): 
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Table 1. Indian Space Budget 2007 - 2010 
 Interim 2009-20101* 
(in crores of Rupees) 
Revised 2008-20092* 
(in crores of Rupees) 
Revised 2007-20083* 
(in crores of Rupees) 
Launch Vehicle 
Technology (Total) 
1914.56 1479.48 1248.58 
Satellite Technology 
(Total) 
731.36 599.55 467.08 
Launch Support, Tracking 
Network & Range Facility 
(Total) 
441.43 404.89 301.34 
Space Applications (Total) 546.68 402.75 299.75 
Space Sciences (Total) 283.74 268.29 321.60 
Direction & 
Administration / 
Other Programs (Total) 
87.52 101.22 73.18 
INSAT Operational 
(Total) 
446.28   235.89   573.57   
Grand Total 4459.00 ($892 million) 3499.00 ($700 million) 3290.00 ($658 million) 
1(Union Budget 2009-2010, 2009, p. 216-18) 
2(Union Budget 2008-2009, 2008, p. 216-18) 
3(Union Budget 2007-2008, 2007, p. 213-15) 
*includes planned and non-planned outlays, an Indian crore is equal to 10,000,000. 
 
There are various estimates available from different sources, for analysis purposes a uniform 
exchange rate of 1 dollar equals 50 rupees was used. Herein, a slight variation may occur from 
official figures as constituted by the Government of India, Union Budget and the Department of 
Space total outlays.  The total outlays have increased over time for the space programs, with the 
bulk of the funds allocated for space technology (includes Launch Vehicle Technology, Satellite 
Technology and Launch Support, Tracking Network & Range Facility) , making up 69 percent 
(2009-10), 70 percent (2008-09 and 61 percent (2007-08) of the space budget. Furthermore, the 
majority of the space technology funds went towards launch technology, 43 percent (2008-10) 
and 37 percent (2007-09). The ‘needs’ based space applications programs were allocated 12 
percent (2008-10) and 9 percent (2007-08) of the collective space budget.  The Direction & 
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Administration/Other Programs include, “Special Indigenisation/Advance Ordering: 
Indigenisation envisages ISRO to have interface with the Indian Industry to develop various 
electronic components, materials, chemicals, etc., for the space programme. The scope of the 
scheme also includes procurement of certain long lead and critical items for futuristic missions. 
Others: Under this, provision has been included for ISRO Headquarters, International Co-
operation and Central Management” (Union Budget 2009-2010, 2009, p. 221).  
 
The Chandrayan 1 and 2 lunar missions are categorized under Space Sciences, were 
allocated 90 crores ($18 million). Also, allocation for the Manned Mission Initiatives/Human 
Space Flight Programme has increased from year 2008-09, 42 crores ($8.4 million) to 50 crores 
($10 million) for 2009-10. "We are spending hardly 0.5% of our national budget on our 
scientific programs, and what we are spending on Chandrayan is hardly only 3% of our budget 
over the last five years," according to ISRO chief Madhavan Nair (Murthy, 2008, para. 8). The 
official DOS budget reflects a major emphasis on developing space technologies such as the new 
GSLV Mark III with the upper stage cryogenic engine. This development is critical to the future 
of the space program, as India will be able to place heavier payloads into orbit, about 4,400 kg 
payload to geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO), or 10 ton to low earth orbit (LEO), joining an 
elite group of nations with the capability in making the nation completely self-sufficient in 
launching various satellites (Space Launch Vehicles, n.d., para. 24). The mastering of cryogenic 
technology is critical to this accomplishment.  
 
Currently, India uses the European services of the Ariane-5 rocket for the heaviest payloads. 
The previous technology sanctions placed on the Russian-Indo cryogenic deal have been 
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overcome after a decade and a half of indigenous efforts. The GSLV III opens many new 
frontiers for India’s space policies: 
• commercially India can compete globally for all types of satellite launches 
• it enhances the program’s prestige and stature as only a few nations have mastered 
cryogenic engine technology 
• makes the nations self-reliant in launch technology 
• it expands the space exploration options for the ISRO 
o future Chandrayan 2 lunar, human spaceflight and mars probe missions will use 
the rocket, garnering further prestige to the nation 
The nation has not deviated from its commitment from space applications, as the funding has 
increased every year. This shows that even though priorities may have shifted to more prestige 
projects, the ISRO is still committed to the space socio-economic policies. The pursuit by ISRO 
for space exploration missions is a policy underlined by the need to maintain relevancy as a 
space program in the 21st century. China has reignited the imagination and zeal for manned 
missions to the moon, creating a new space race in Asia.  Prestige plays important roles for both 
space programs, however, traditionally less so for India. The budget also reflects that India’s will 
continue its policy of enhancing autonomous space capability in design, development, 
manufacturing, launching and operations of its indigenous space program. 
 
The program is expanding its space policies beyond the socio-economic benefits to the 
common man, but to increase self-sufficiency in space capabilities, access and maintain 
independent use of space, enhance international cooperation and promote space commerce, 
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explore space as to stay relevant in the new century, accrue recognition and prestige as an elite 
space program and attain top space power status in Asia.  
 
China 
 
With three successful Shenzhou V – VII missions and Chang’e-1 lunar mission, the wider 
question is where is China’s space policy heading? In an era of growing interest in space 
exploration, China’s space policy expansion is in alignment with other space powers, such as 
US, Europe and India. Beijing’s space policy has been interrelated with its military and domestic 
policies. The relationship between China's ballistic missile and space program has been there 
since the program’s inception, evolving from strategic considerations of acquiring nuclear 
missiles for national defense. Mao’s ascent required the need for prestige and intense nationalism 
to dictate the terms of space policy. A space program allowed the developing China to build 
strong nuclear and missile based defenses, as well providing a fast track towards national 
development.  The space program was the first critical high technology and science effort in the 
nation. Science and technology were the paths towards socio-economic and defense 
development, seeking autonomy in science was critical to the power trajectory of China. In the 
formulation of its space policy, the goal has been to gain ‘asymmetric equivalency’ with 
technologically advanced nations.  
 
In the beginning, budget constraints, dearth of skilled scientific labor pool and lack of 
advanced technology infrastructure led Beijing to adopt  the policy of ‘asymmetric equivalency,’ 
gain technological parity with developed nations overtime achieving it within the constraints of a 
developing nation by leveraging international cooperation to access space know and technology, 
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gain technology through illicit means, use cooperation to develop soft power influence with 
nations, space agencies and international organizations and leverage low-cost labor pool to 
provide cost-effective development of the space program. These imperatives, along with military 
and economic gave the space program incentives to create space applications, combined with the 
requisite launch vehicles, allowed the space program to prosper.  
 
The space program has prospered over the years, overcoming sanctions, technological 
denial, economic constraints and domestic politics. The space community questions why China 
sought a manned space program. Even though the question was hotly debated among the Chinese 
space community, there was strong support for the policy by the CCP as it bolstered its respect 
and prestige (Gilks, 1997, p. 221).  The Chinese people are duly justified being proud of their 
space program and what it has achieved in military and civilian terms. This achievement is more 
significant due to the budget constraints the space program has operated in. Unlike the Indian 
space program the official space budget has not been made public. Also, since the Chinese space 
program is controlled by the military, it is inherently a military space program; it is difficult to 
discern how much of the unofficial military budget is sanctioned for the space activities.  
Furthermore, as missile development and other military technologies are handled under the 
auspices of the space arena, it becomes even cloudier, thus one cannot clearly delineate portions 
of the military budget from the official space budget.   
  
Herein, the space program’s real budget remains hidden. Authorized documents and 
China’s White Paper on space activities do not offer budgetary figures, though they include the 
nation’s space achievements and future plans. The latest official White Paper, “China's Space 
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Activities in 2006” and the first one released in the year 2000 are without any budgetary 
numbers. Researchers have to rely on unofficial sources and estimations, as well as statements 
from Chinese officials to ascertain China’s space policies through broad strokes. India provides 
an official “Union Budget” which contains the DOS budget, which is further broken down into 
budgets for various space activities. The space budget it freely available on the internet through a 
Government of India website, along with budgets of all the major ministries and departments.  
This is in sharp contrast to official CNSA and other government websites, which do not carry 
any detailed information just broad generalities. According to the World Security Institute, 
China’s space budget was $500 million (2005) and1.5 billion (2006). Estimates of China's space 
program by international sources fluctuate considerably. Such estimates are unsupported by 
documentation; western media claims that Beijing’s annual space expenditures are between $1.3 
billion to $3 billion. This budget excludes the likely probability of billions poured into military-
linked space activities. However, majority consensus seems to be that China's annual space 
spending is around $1.5 to $2 billion, if true is more than double of India’s and comparable to 
Japan’s spending. This compares to the budget of $16 billion annually for NASA and $6 billion 
for the European Space Agency (China Space Budget, n.d., para. 6). 
 
According to Sun Laiyan, administrator of CNSA, the government had spent: up to late 
2006, 19 billion yuan ($2.4 billion) on the initial five Shenzhou spacecraft, one billion yuan 
($125 million) on the Shenzhou VI, the primary stage of the three stage Chang'e lunar Program 
cost slightly over one billion yuan ($125 million) and the Chang'e lunar project budget at 1.4 
billion yuan ($170 million) (Chinese Annual Space Budget Exceeds Two Billion Dollars, 2006, 
para. 1-8). A 2008 report issued by Paris-based Euroconsult, "World Prospects for Government 
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Space Markets", states that CNSA 2009 budget is approximately US$1.3 billion. Launch vehicle 
technology accounts for about 25% ($325 million) of total space budget followed by Earth 
observation and human spaceflight, accounting 20% ($260 million) each of the collective space 
expenditures. Meanwhile, satellite communications and navigation both are estimated to be 
about 10% ($130 million) of the entire space budget (Brown, 2009, para. 4-5). According to 
Euroconsult, China spends approximately 65% (2009-10) on space technologies (launch 
vehicles, satellites, earth observations, compared to India’s 69% (2009-10), but China’s figures 
do not include expenses for support of space technologies platforms such as, launch support, 
tracking network and range facilities. Somehow, if you estimate the cost it is approximate to 
India’s or higher, and then it is clear that both nations’ expenses are similar with regards to space 
technology.  This is logical, as China requires investment in its space exploration, is developing a 
new powerful Long March 5 rocket and it attempting to establish itself as a credible alternative 
to the West in space commerce.  
 
It is also notable that these figures are best guesses (no documentation support) and even 
administrator Laiyan’s statements must with be viewed with skepticism, as the Chinese 
government is notorious for fudging official figures. Most likely administrator Laiyan will 
provide a low-ball estimate of the true higher costs of any space activity because a low estimate 
can gain higher prestige value in the international arena. For example, China can boast that it 
cost $25 to develop a certain project while a comparable project may cost $100 in the West; 
hence China is able to achieve the same project as the West at one-fourth the cost, more cost 
effective. This is a commonly employed Chinese strategy used for garnering higher prestige 
value.  Also, recent transition in China’s space policy to space exploration has been replicated by 
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India. However, in China’s case its space endeavors have a military foundation that is why the 
international community is wary of China’s higher profile in space, even more so than before, 
especially after Beijing’s reckless ASAT military weapons test in 2007.  
 
The revised official military budget for 2009, as per Chinese government stands at 480.6 
billion yuan ($70.3 billion), a 14.9 percent jump from 2008 (Lawrence, 2009, para. 1-2). But in 
its annual report to congress, the Pentagon’s “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2009,” states that China’s entire military-related spending for 2008 was between $105 billion and 
$150 billion, using 2007 exchange rates and prices. The Pentagon report serves as a better 
guideline, as the PLA would intentionally understate its true military expenditures. If the 
Pentagon estimates are accurate than it can be logically surmised that China’s space budget is 
significantly more than publically stated, if the military linked expenses are included.  
 
China’s military space program remains opaque to the international community, which 
complicates peaceful space cooperation. Beijing permits cooperation in the civilian space sector 
without the military side of it, to bolster the PRC’s credentials as a peace-loving nation. This 
adds to the misgivings and distrust already present within other nations of China, not helped 
further by Beijing’s illicit nuclear and missile proliferation. The space program has continued to 
accrue legitimacy and prestige to the CCP.  Herein, the CCP wouldn’t receive the same 
legitimacy and prestige if military components of the space program were publically 
acknowledged. Beijing’s public space policy has been seen for what is by rational space policy 
experts, a façade that hides China’s true policy intentions, to use the military space program for 
primary military purposes in order to leapfrog to dominant world power. The lack of 
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transparency in official space budget details available to the public clearly reflects a hidden 
agenda. Distrust, illicit technology proliferation, hidden agendas and excessive secrecy are the 
main obstacles to China realizing full potential in international cooperation and space commerce. 
Herein, its neighbors, Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan are enhancing their military 
capabilities.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
The quest for space has ignited minds since the nineteenth century. It has taken many 
thousands of years to reach the current status of space activity and technology. The 20th century 
may be looked upon by future generations as the true origins of tangible utilization of space for 
the benefit of mankind or laying the seeds of its destruction through militarization of space; only 
time will tell. The responsible people of the world are pondering these sentiments now. Certain 
space powers have already chosen the latter path without the consent of the governed, a path 
chosen by men in uniforms and blessed by their governments. Some well established space 
powers see militarization as a natural evolution of the civilian program, some emerging space 
powers see it as devolution in the concept of space belonging to all mankind, not as a bastion to 
be dominated by one or the few.  
 
The emerging space powers, India and China are against the concept of a space denial 
regime, the militarization of space. The full spectrum domination of space is an expensive 
proposition, especially for developing nations. As developing nations, India and China have 
followed different paths in their quest for space. India began its space program almost a decade 
after Mao Zedong declared China would become a world power through space activities. The 
activities of India’s program had origins in the ideals of Nehruvian socialism, the use of space to 
cure the ills of the common man in India through socio-economic space applications. The space 
upliftment social project continues to be the cornerstone of New Delhi’s civilian space program’s 
objectives.  
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The objectives of the Chinese space program have at its cornerstone, military 
applications. Mao wanted China to have great power status and international prestige, this could 
be accrued by following the footsteps of the space programs of the US and Soviet Union. Both 
nations’ space programs started as military space programs to develop missiles as platforms for 
nuclear delivery. The missiles not only provided great power status and prestige but the ability to 
have independence of leverage in a hostile situation. One cannot be powerful without 
sovereignty of action and means of exerting leverage upon others. Herein, the new China, 
coming out of the yoke of imperialism laid the genesis for achieving international power and 
prestige though the militarization of its space program. 
 
Over time, China’s space program grew to employ the activities similar to India’s civilian 
space program, that of space applications that provide socio-economic benefits. Both nations 
have advanced their respective programs to such a degree that they are narrowing the space 
competitiveness gap with the US.  It is natural for Asia’s two giants to be competitive in space 
endeavors. The competition has yielded advanced space technologies that benefit not only 
civilians but the military as well, dual-use technologies. Both nations possess dual-use 
technologies such as, launch vehicles, resource, navigation and communication satellites that can 
have military applications as well. In India’s case such technologies were not knowingly 
manufactured for a military purpose. The ISRO wears it civilian badge with pride and attempts to 
maintain the distinction as a civilian space agency.   
 
However, in China’s case, its space program has, since inception been controlled by the 
military, in its essence it is a military space program that supports civilian space 
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applications/technologies. The CNSA acts as the civilian public face of Beijing’s military space 
program, allowing it to escape international scrutiny, make easier space diplomacy, 
access/develop cutting edge space technology and increase its international prestige.  
 
Prestige is important to India and China at the world stage; their space programs raise 
their international stature. This is truly evident with the success of India’s Chandrayan-1 mission 
and China’s Shenzhou V-VII manned missions. Both countries are working actively to promote 
space exploration programs in the coming years, solidifying their reputations as cutting edge 
space programs even further. Do the reputations of their space programs translate into being role 
models for developing countries? While China’s space program is nontransparent, accountable to 
the PLA and the CCP and military at its core; is the polar opposite to India’s transparent, 
accountable to the Indian people and civilian at its core space program. Additionally, the 
knowledge China has gained from its space program in missile technology and by extension 
nuclear delivery, hasn’t been restricted within the nation’s borders. China has been a source of 
international destabilization for geopolitical strategic gain in the form of nuclear and missile 
technology proliferation, even though it is a signatory of the nonproliferation regime. India is not 
a signatory of the nonproliferation regime but has always abided by its principles by never 
illicitly proliferating technology earned through its space program. Recently, it was recognized 
as a responsible nuclear and space power by receiving “de facto” international status and 
recognition as a responsible nuclear power within the comity of nations.  
 
India and China have built remarkable space programs within a span of a few decades 
with limited resources. The paper has shown that domestics and geopolitics are indeed 
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motivating factors for these developing space programs. For India, the domestic goals were 
social and economic upliftment of its people and for the Chinese it was military self defense 
through missile development as well as garnering prestige. Also, geopolitics was a critical 
determinant in China’s space program. The paper findings showed that the China wanted to 
remedy the military disparity between it and a perceived hostile environment from Cold War 
powers United Stated and Soviet Union, particularly in missile technology.  Chinese principal 
interest lay in having ballistic missiles capable of reaching distant targets.  
 
It was also revealing that the two programs are developing similarly as they are moving 
in tandem with emphasis on space exploration and manned spaceflight. It is becoming harder to 
distinguish the two space programs, the main difference being the military nature of China’s 
space program. Due to the new emphasis on space exploration and human spaceflight, Indian and 
Chinese space programs are not considered role models for developing nations. It is this 
researcher’s recommendation that the dynamic space programs of India and China be continually 
reviewed as to see any permanent shift in their respective space policies. Any permanent shift 
will be more visible in India’s case due to the initial motivation of its space program. Ultimately, 
the capabilities of one nation aspiring for space dominance through weaponization of space will 
lead others to react in kind to protect their right of sovereign action, and then no space program 
will be a role model.   
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APPENDIX A: INDIAN SPACE CENTERS 
 
Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC) 
• Premier center for rocket and launch vehicle development 
• Research and development activities include aeronautics, avionics, mechanical 
engineering and materials, composites and solid propulsion 
• Systems reliability, polymers and chemicals, propellants, and computer and information 
• Functional Ammonium Perchlorate Experimental Plant  
• Space Physics Laborator does research in atmospheric and associated space sciences 
• Developed sounding rockets, launch vehicles, SLV 3, ASLV, PSLV, and GSLV (Vikram 
Sarabhai Space Centre, n.d.).  
ISRO Satellite Centre (ISAC) 
• Satellite technology lead center 
• Performs activities related to power systems, digital systems, microwave systems and 
communication, control systems, systems reliability and space physics, spacecraft 
assembly integration and testing, thermal, spacecraft mission planning and analysis, 
structures, spacecraft mechanisms, computers and information  
• Satellite projects facilities include fabrication and testing 
• ISAC umbrella includes Laboratory for Electro-Optic Sensors (LEOS)  
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• Realization of success in design and development of diverse types of 23 satellites thus 
far, including, communication, scientific and remote sensing (ISRO Satellite Centre, 
n.d.).  
Satish Dhawan Space Centre, SHAR 
• India’s premier launch centre, 62 mi north of Chennai 
• Conducts ground tests and processes solid propellant motors  
• Thumba is the launch range 
• Established launch complexes for Sounding rockets, SLV- 3, ASLV, PSLV, GSLV 
(Satish Dhawan Space Centre, n.d.)   
Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre (LPSC) 
• Develops liquid and cryogenic propulsion stages for launch vehicles and auxiliary 
propulsion systems for both satellites and launch vehicles 
• Activities connected to liquid propulsion stages, cryogenic propulsion stages and control 
systems for launch vehicles and spacecraft  
• In Banglore are the precision fabrication facilities, production of transducers and 
integration of satellite propulsion systems 
• Developed control systems for SLV-3, ASLV, PSLV and GSLV, liquid propellant stages 
for PSLV, satellite propulsion systems as well as those for IRS and INSAT production of 
pressure transducers (Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre, n.d.).  
 
 
112 
 
Space Applications Centre (SAC) 
• A major component of the Indian Space Research Organization engaged in the research, 
development and exhibition of applications of Space Technology in the field of Remote 
Sensing, Communications, Meteorology and Satellite Navigation 
• R&D on ground systems, onboard systems, and end user equipment software and 
hardware  
• Developed meteorological and communication payloads for INSAT, microwave and 
pptical payloads for IRS satellites  
• Offers infrastructure for training courses to the students of CSSTEAP (Space 
Applications Centre, n.d.).  
Development and Educational Communication Unit (DECU)  
Deals in the conception, definition, planning and socio economic appraisal of space applications 
programs, below are its main roles: 
  
• Conceives space applications programs to meet social needs 
• Examines existing societal needs and projects future needs to serve as inputs to the 
planning of space applications system 
• Planning for experimental and operational space applications programs 
• Studying social, economic and cultural impact of mew technologies. 
• Designing and producing suitable system software strategies (Development and 
Educational Communication Unit: About Us, n.d.)  
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ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC) 
• Gives mission support to near-earth satellites and launch vehicle missions 
• Network of ground stations at Bangalore, Lucknow, Port Blair, Sriharikota, 
Thiruvananthapuram 
• Additional network of TTC stations at Brunei, Bearslake (Russia), Biak (Indonesia) and 
Mauritius. Banglore houses multi-mission Spacecraft Control Centre 
• Supports IRS-1B, IRS-1C, IRS-1D IRS-P3, IRS-P4 and SROSS-C2 satellites 
• Part of the international Satellite-Aided Search and Rescue Program (ISRO Telemetry, 
Tracking and Command Network, n.d.)  
INSAT Master Control Facility (MCF) 
• In charge of INSAT post-launch operations, such as station keeping, orbit maneuvers, 
and on-orbit operations 
• Supports on-orbit operations on series INSAT-3A, INSAT-3B, INSAT-3C, INSAT-3E, 
Kalpana-1 and GSAT-3 satellites (INSAT Master Control Facility, n.d.). 
ISRO Inertial Systems Unit (IISU) 
• Develops inertial sensors and systems for launch vehicles and satellites, including 
satellite inertial systems, navigation systems, bearing and space tribology and inertial 
systems integration and simulation 
• Performs precision fabrication, assembly, integration and testing 
• Developed inertial systems for ISRO satellites and launch vehicles, solar array drive 
assemblies, scanning mechanisms, and more (ISRO Inertial Systems Unit, n.d.).   
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National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA) 
• An independent institution supported by the Department of Space  
• Responsible for acquiring, processing and delivering of data from remote sensing 
satellites 
• Performs projects involving remote sensing application in collaboration with the users 
• In command of production and implementation of specific action plans under Integrated 
Mission for Sustainable Development in 174 districts of India 
• In charge of the Indian Institute of Remote Sensing at Dehra Dun 
• Shadnagar satellite earth-station, near Hyderabad, receives data from Indian remote 
sensing satellites, NOAA and US Landsat, French SPOT and microwave data from the 
European remote sensing satellite ERS 
• Supplied data from series IRS-1B, IRS-1C, IRS-1D, IRS-P3 and IRS-P4 to the end users 
(National Remote Sensing Agency, n.d.).    
Regional Remote Sensing Service Centre 
Setting up of the center arose out of the importance and need of natural resources 
management in the country; Government of India formed the National Natural Resources 
Management System (NNRMS). NNRMS is a combined approach for management of natural 
resources, integrating the advantages of information derived remote sensing technology and 
conventional systems. With the long standing mission the Indian Space program of optimum use 
of space technology for national development, the Department of Space (DOS) has been 
responsible, as the nodal department in India for evolution, establishment of NNRMS and all 
remote sensing related actions. Herein, DOS has established five Regional Remote Sensing 
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Service Centers (RRSSCs) for analysis of remote sensing data to develop planning related inputs 
on natural resources management. These centers reside at Bangalore (Southern Region), 
Dehradun (Northern Region), Jodhpur (Western Region), Kharagpur (Eastern Region), and 
Nagpur (Central Region) and function under RRSSC and ISRO.  
Additional Area of activities: 
• Support execution of national projects and promote remote sensing applications 
• Develop software  
• Education and training (Regional Remote Sensing Service Centre, n.d.)  
 Physical Research Laboratory (PRL) 
• Center for research in space and allied sciences, such as astronomy and astrophysics, 
aeronomy and earth sciences, planetary atmosphere, solar system studies and theoretical 
physics (Physical Research Laboratory, n.d.).     
National Atmospheric Research Laboratory (NARL)  
NARL is an independent research laboratory with funding provided by the Department of 
Space, working on fundamental and applied research in Atmospheric and Space Sciences. Since 
its inception in 1992 as the National Mesosphere-Stratosphere-Troposphere (MST) Radar 
Facility, it has evolved into a premier center for atmospheric research in India (National 
Atmospheric Research Laboratory, n.d.).    
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Antrix Corporation Limited 
 
Since 1992, Department of Space (DOS) commercial arm, Antrix promotes commercial 
exploration of services and products from the Indian Space Program. Antrix markets space 
services and products to diverse international customers, based on remarkable assortment of 
accomplishments and developments over the last four decades in the Indian space program. 
(Antrix Corporation Limited: About Us, n.d., para. 1).  
 
Semi-Conductor Laboratory 
• Lays R&D foundation in India in the field of microelectronics 
• Design & Development of cutting edge systems/devices  
• Manufactures MEMS/ VLSI based systems & sub-systems (Semi-Conductor Laboratory: 
Preamble, n.d.).    
Indian Institute of Space Science and Technology (IIST)     
IIST offers Bachelors, Masters, Doctoral and Post-Doctoral programs in Space 
Technology, with specialization in Aerospace Engineering, Avionics and Integrated MSc in 
Apllied Science. Also, promote stimulation, conservation, and dissemination of knowledge in 
varied scientific and academic fields (Indian Institute of Space Science and Technology: 
Objectives, n.d.). 
 
 
117 
 
National Natural Resources Management System (NNRMS) 
It is an inter-agency system for integrated management for natural resources in India.  
The major activities of NNRMS include: 
 
• Determine user/application requirements for remote sensing 
• Establish proper utilization systems for use of remote sensing images and traditional data 
for resource management activities  
• Maximize use of information for disaster management support, environmental 
monitoring, natural resource management and empowering society (National Natural 
Resources Management System, n.d.).   
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